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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THE GAP BETWEEN WHAT TAXPAYERS WANT AND WHAT TAX 
PROFESSIONALS THINK THEY WANT: A REEXAMINATION OF CLIENT 
EXPECTATIONS AND TAX PROFESSIONAL AGGRESSIVENESS  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to resolve an apparent conflict between the services 
that tax preparers provide and the tax preparation services taxpayers seek. Some 
literature demonstrates that tax professionals equate client advocacy with taking 
aggressive tax positions and minimizing taxes. Other literature suggests taxpayers seek 
to increase accuracy and reduce the probability of tax audit when they hire a tax 
professional. This difference is an "expectation gap." 
 The methodology employed to examine this issue is a survey of tax 
professionals at various levels of expertise. This survey asks tax preparers what they 
believe motivates their clients to seek professional tax preparation services. It also asks 
how aggressive a tax professional should be in minimizing clients’ taxes. A similar 
survey sent to taxpayers who use the services of a tax preparer asked the same 
questions about taxpayers’ primary motivation in seeking professional tax preparation 
services and then about how they believe their tax preparer would answer the questions 
about aggressive tax reporting.   
 This dissertation extends the research in several ways. In previous studies, 
taxpayer motivation has been determined by using a simple checklist or an open-ended 
question. Instead of using these approaches, I developed a scale using methods that 
rigorously test for validity. In measuring client advocacy, I use a scale that has been 
recently developed and used in the literature. While previous research has shown the 
disparity between what tax professionals provide and what taxpayers want, no study 
has asked each group how they believe the other group will respond. This will provide 
a measure of the degree of understanding each group has of the other.  
 This research show that there is an expectation gap between taxpayers and their 
tax preparers at all levels, and that this gap is statistically significant.  However, the 
actual size of the gap is small; accuracy and client advocacy have the largest gaps.  
Additional findings are that timesavings is more important to taxpayers with children, 
that contact with the IRS is correlated with a lower desire to avoid it, and that lower tax 
knowledge is correlated with stronger desire for an accurate return. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
This dissertation examines the relationship between tax professionals and their clients. 
Specifically, the “expectation gap” between what taxpayers seek when they hire a tax 
professional and what tax professionals believe they want is examined. Additionally, 
exploratory research is done to examine the correlations between different characteristics of 
taxpayers and tax professionals and their taste for tax aggressiveness.   
 Prior literature shows a mismatch between taxpayers’ objectives and risk preferences 
and tax professionals’ objectives in preparing tax returns (Schisler and Galbreath 2000; Hite 
and Hasseldine 2003). Specifically, client advocacy is understood in the accounting literature 
and tax profession as tax minimization, whereas research shows that most taxpayers seek 
accuracy as opposed to minimization when they hire a professional (Yankelovich 1984; 
Collins, Milliron, and Toy 1990).  Additionally, taxpayers view tax audit as a failure on the part 
of their preparer and are more likely to change preparers when audited, yet tax preparers 
tend to get more aggressive with tax minimization measures as they gain more experience 
with audits and the Internal Revenue Service (Duncan, LaRue, and Reckers 1989; Schisler 
and Galbreath 2000).  Also, more expert tax practitioners have both the motivation and ability 
to be more tax aggressive (Jackson, Milliron, and Toy 1988).  Finally, some taxpayers may 
hire tax preparation services to shield themselves from direct interaction with the IRS in case 
of audit (Dubin, Graetz, Udell, and Wilde 1992; Nichols and Price 2004) or to provide 
insurance against penalties and other sanctions (Scotchmer 1989; Hite and Hasseldine 
2003; Nichols and Price 2004). 
 This dissertation answers several questions related to the difference between 
taxpayers’ expectations and tax professionals’ perceptions of those expectations. I develop a 
scale to identify what taxpayers’ expectations are when they have their taxes professionally 
prepared. Using that scale, along with a scale developed by Mason and Levy (2001) to 
measure tax professionals’ client advocacy, I compare the two groups.   I use demographics 
collected on both taxpayers and tax professionals to evaluate how the size of the expectation 
gap differs among groups. Finally, I determine how well taxpayers choose their tax 
professional based on these dimensions. This dissertation will inform tax practitioners’ 
advocacy and aid in increasing client retention and satisfaction. Additionally, if taxpayers 
desire less aggressive tax advice, more conservative tax- reporting could reduce risk and 
fees and increase revenue while benefiting the tax practitioner-client relationship. 
 This dissertation shows that there is an expectation gap between tax preparers at 
small and regional firms and the taxpayers that hired them. This expectation gap persists 
between taxpayers and the tax preparers that they hire. Additionally, the data suggest that 
the levels of client advocacy do not differ between CPAs and non-CPAs as shown in prior 
literature, that the clients of National Tax Preparation firms have a stronger desire for an 
accurate return than do other taxpayers, and that taxpayers with children do find saving time 
to be important. It also shows that lower tax knowledge is correlated with a stronger desire 
for an accurate return. Finally, the data show that among taxpayers that hire a tax preparer, 
contact with the IRS reduces the desire to avoid it. 
 The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two is background and 
motivation. Chapter Three discusses the development of an instrument to measure taxpayer 
motivation in hiring a tax professional. Chapter Four is the hypothesis development, data 
©Teresa Stephenson 2006 1
collection, experimental method, analysis, and a brief summary of conclusions, limitations 
and further research. 
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Chapter 2 Background and Motivation 
2.1 Introduction 
Little research exists on the interaction between tax preparers and taxpayers; more is 
needed considering the vast amount of time and money spent on tax compliance (Roth, 
Scholz, and Witte 1989). Hite and Hasseldine (2003) point out that what society expects of 
tax practitioners does not always correspond with the practitioners’ views or capabilities. If 
there is an expectation gap – a discrepancy between what the client expects and what the 
preparer thinks the client expects – as has been found in prior research (Christensen 1992), 
then there is a hidden cost of risk of audit (and sanctions) being passed on to taxpayers 
without their knowledge or consent. 
 Economic theory suggests that when your marginal cost (in time and/or money) to 
prepare your own tax return exceeds the cost of hiring someone else to do so, you would hire 
a tax preparer. Empirical evidence supports this concept. Although tax preparation costs 
billions of dollars, over half of all taxpayers have their returns professionally prepared 
(Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Long and Caudill 1987; Collins, Milliron, and Toy 1990; Guyton, 
O'Hare, Stavrianos, and Toder 2003). Taxpayers are more likely to hire a professional 
preparer as their return gets more complicated, as their time becomes more limited, and as 
their income rises (Dubin et al. 1992; Christian, Gupta, and Lin 1993; Ashley and Segal 1997; 
Arena, O'Hare, and Stavrianos 2002).  
 We have little information about how taxpayers choose a preparer (McColl-Kennedy 
and Fetter 1999). Due to the intangible1 nature of tax preparation, the low audit rate and the 
time between tax preparation and audit, taxpayers have little means of getting objective 
feedback on their tax preparers (Christensen 1992; Iacobucci 1992; Ostrom and Iacobucci 
1995; Myers and Morris 1999). Regardless, taxpayers have shown a tendency to claim 
accuracy as their main objective in tax preparation (Yankelovich 1984; Collins, Milliron, and 
Toy 1990).    
 Tax preparers and tax researchers often equate client advocacy with tax minimization, 
and efforts toward tax minimization increase with experience and certification (Raby 1983; 
Ayres, Jackson, and Hite 1989; Reckers, Sanders, and Wyndelts 1991; Hatfield 2000). This 
tendency towards tax minimization is supported by lower tax liabilities overall for 
professionally prepared rather than self-prepared returns (Long and Caudill 1987; Christian, 
Gupta, Weber, and Willis 1994). Additionally, recent findings show taxpayers represented by 
tax professionals during audit have lower adjustments to their taxes due than taxpayers 
representing themselves (Hite and Hasseldine 2003)2. 
 One contribution this dissertation makes is by extending Christensen’s (1992). She 
explored the expectation gap between tax practitioners in the (then) Big Six and their clients. 
She found taxpayers felt their tax preparers did not understand the degree to which 
taxpayers wished to avoid audit. Communication problems were another frequent complaint 
tax clients mentioned during her study.  
                                                 
1 Intangible here is used to mean “incapable of being perceived by the senses” as defined at www.dictionary.com. This is 
not to be confused with accounting’s sense of intangible as something without physical substance that provides a future 
value. 
2 This could be due to more accurate returns being filed by the professionals; however, this research attributed it to greater 
tax aggressiveness during represented audits. 
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 I extend her research by using tax preparers from small and regional firms. This is a 
significant contribution as the majority of tax returns that are professionally prepared are not 
by CPAs and attorneys. A sample of the 1979 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
(TCMP) data reveals that less than 20 percent of returns filed with a paid professional’s 
signature were prepared by CPAs or attorneys (Erard 1993).  Also, a 1987 IRS survey shows 
that about half of all professionally prepared returns are done by preparers who are not 
attorneys, CPAs or even Enrolled Agents (Cuccia 1995). The market for tax services is highly 
segmented and the clients’ motivation in hiring a practitioner may well direct the kind of 
practitioner they seek (Jackson, Milliron, and Toy 1988).     
 Additionally, prior research has asked about client motivation using simple checklists, 
assuming three or four motivations, or with open-ended questions (Yankelovich 1984; 
Collins, Milliron, and Toy 1990; Frischmann and Frees 1999). I use established scale-
development procedures to identify motivations and develop a scale to measure them on an 
individual basis. Using that scale, along with a scale developed by Mason and Levy (2001) to 
measure tax preparers’ client advocacy, I compare the two groups.  Finally, I determine how 
well taxpayers choose their tax preparers based on these dimensions. 
 
2.2 Definitions 
Several terms occur repeatedly in this dissertation. This section defines how those terms are 
used. 
 “Accuracy” has been denoted as a primary motivation to hire a tax preparer 
(Yankelovich 1984; Collins, Milliron, and Toy 1992). Frischmann and Frees (1999) referred to 
this as “uncertainty reduction.” There are two ways to interpret this. First, it may be the desire 
to have one’s taxes prepared in such a way as to pay the closest amount possible to the 
“correct” tax – to reduce the variance around the “true tax” as would be found by a panel of 
experts3. Second, it may be the desire to have one’s taxes prepared in compliance with rules 
and regulations in such a way as to avoid coming under scrutiny from the IRS – to err 
systematically on the side of conservatism. I use the first interpretation as accuracy; the 
second definition is “audit avoidance” in this dissertation.   
 “Audit avoidance” means preparing a tax return in such a way as to minimize the 
likelihood of audit. This implies ambiguities are to be resolved in a conservative manner. 
 “Client advocacy” implies taking professional care of your clients’ interests. However, 
this means tax minimization among tax practitioners and in the tax research literature (see for 
example, Ayres, Jackson, and Hite 1989, Reckers, Sanders, and Wyndelts 1991, and 
Hatfield 2000). In keeping with the rest of the taxation literature, I will maintain this 
convention.  However, it should be noted that this is a very narrow definition of advocacy and 
it explicitly assumes that tax clients all wish tax minimization regardless of risk.  General 
economic and finance literature indicate that there is a trade-off between saving money and 
risk preferences.  The tax literature seems to ignore that trade-off and define advocacy 
strictly in terms of tax minimization. 
                                                 
3 Taxation, like most of accounting, sometimes involves estimates and approximations. It also involves interpreting a 
myriad of law. Consequently, in many cases no two tax preparers will come up with the same tax liability for the same set 
of facts. 
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 “Expectations Gap” is taken from the marketing literature and means the difference 
between client expectations and the professional’s perceptions of those expectations and 
vice versa. 
 “Tax aggressiveness” involves taking advantage of every legal4 opportunity for tax 
minimization (see for example, Schisler 1994, Cloyd 1995, and Spilker, Worsham and Prawitt 
1999). Note this does not include tax evasion or fraud. There are vast areas in tax 
compliance and planning where different interpretations and presentations of facts result in 
diverse tax liabilities. An aggressive tax preparer would tend to interpret facts to fit client 
favorable fact patterns and report in such a way as to incur the lowest possible tax as long as 
the stands taken have at least a one in three chance of judiciary success (See for example 
Cloyd 1995, and Cloyd and Spilker 1999). 
 “Tax Gap” is the gap between what taxpayers timely and accurately paid in taxes in a 
given year and what they owed.5 For 2001, the GAO estimated it at around $257 billion, 
more than triple what it was in 1988 (Fischer, Wartick, and Mark 1992; GAO 2005).  When I 
use this term, I mean gross Tax Gap, or the Tax Gap before collections. 
 “Tax minimization” refers to efforts made to reduce the overall tax liability of the 
taxpayer through legal and authorized means. Consequently, this does not include frivolous 
stands or tax evasion. Any stand taken must be “sustained on its merits” or, in other words, 
the tax preparer must believe it has at least a one in three chance of judiciary success.6  This 
definition is similar to “tax aggressiveness7 in that there is a broad definition of “legal and 
authorized.”  The main concept here is that this is different than tax evasion which includes 
actual misreporting of income and expenses or willfully leaving required items off the tax 
return. 
 Freshman and Frees (1999) used "time savings" as a factor for selecting a tax 
preparer. Time savings occur when a taxpayer spends less time on all compliance related 
matters by using a tax preparer than with self-preparation. 
2.3 Tax Preparation Costs 
Paid tax professionals8 provide several services including tax return preparation, ambiguity 
resolution regarding tax issues, tax planning services, and representation before the IRS in 
case of audit (Scotchmer 1989). Long and Caudill (1987) state that in 1983 paid preparers 
prepared 45 percent of tax returns. Slemrod and Sorum (1984) calculated compliance to be 
at a cost of about $3 billion. Collins, Milliron and Toy (1990) found tax preparation cost rose 
to $4.4 billion by 1987. Long and Caudill (1993) show tax preparation costs continued to 
increase to between $7-13 billion in 1989. For 2000, these costs were estimated to be $19.4 
billion with an additional 3.4 billion hours of taxpayer time (Guyton, Korobow, Lee, and Toder 
                                                 
4 Legal with the caveat that the law must be interpreted – it is not cut and dried -- and that it is perfectly acceptable to take 
a questionable position as long as the tax professional has reason to believe it stands at least a one-third chance of being 
upheld if litigated. 
5 This definition and the 2001 amount were taken from Government Accounting Office (GAO)  report GAO-050527T 
which can be found at the GAO website.  Of course, there is no definitive answer for what a taxpayer “owes” and so this 
tax gap amount includes government estimates of tax liability for non-filers and uncollected tax-return liabilities. 
6 31 CFT (Code of Federal Regulations) §10.34 
7 Indeed, they are virtually synonymous in the tax literature. 
8 Note that tax preparers are a subset of tax professionals. In this dissertation the term tax preparer is used when discussing 
the restricted activity of tax preparation whereas tax professional is used when the actions taken are broader, for example to 
include tax planning. 
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2005). In 2003, paid preparers signed 61 percent of returns.9 Additionally, tax services 
constitute about 38 percent of accounting industry revenue (Yancey 1996). 
In view of the high costs and great amount of time spent on tax compliance, more research 
about how taxpayers and tax preparers interact is vital. This dissertation adds to the existing 
literature by examining how closely tax preparers of all types understand their clients’ 
expectations and desires and how well taxpayers select their tax preparers. 
2.4 Tax Preparer Use 
In starting research on the relationship between tax professionals and their clients, it is 
important to understand who uses tax professionals. Interestingly, paid tax preparer use is 
over 60 percent, which is an increase from prior years, even while the market for tax 
software has increased (Guyton et al. 2005). Economic theory would suggest that when it 
costs more in time or money to perform an action yourself than to hire someone else to do 
so, you would hire help. The empirical findings that follow support this economic principle. 
 Prior research shows paid preparer use increases with income, age, self-employment, 
return complexity, number of dependents claimed, and marginal tax rate and decreases with 
education and tax knowledge (Slemrod and Sorum 1984; Long and Caudill 1987; Klepper, 
Mazur, and Nagin 1991; Christian, Gupta, and Lin 1993; Arena, O'Hare, and Stavrianos 
2002). Married taxpayers who itemize are less likely to use a paid preparer than other 
taxpayers (Long and Caudill 1987).  As returns become more complex due to increases in 
income, self-employment and return complexity, or as time becomes more scarce due to 
increases in age and dependents claimed, it becomes more cost-effective to hire a preparer. 
The fact that married taxpayers who itemize do not fit this description may be because 
having two adults doubles the chances that one will have the time and/or knowledge to self-
prepare. 
 Collins, Milliron and Toy (1990) surveyed 700 residents of two states receiving 34 
percent usable responses. They split the sample by objective:10 seventy percent claimed 
accuracy was their main objective while 25 percent claimed it was tax minimization. About 
half of each group used a paid preparer. For those with tax minimization as their primary 
objective, the likelihood of hiring a paid preparer increased with income and age and 
decreased with tax knowledge and social responsibility. For those with accuracy as their 
primary motivation, the likelihood of hiring a paid preparer increased with social responsibility 
and return complexity, and decreased with tax knowledge. These findings are consistent 
with prior research.   
 Using 1979 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data, Dubin et al. 
(1992), showed increases in IRS audit rates, age, or state, local and real estate taxes shift 
demand for tax preparation services from NTP firms such as H&R Block to CPAs and 
attorneys. They also found return complexity increases the demand for CPAs and attorneys 
at the expense of self-preparation. Additionally, contrary to previous research, their study 
finds the number of exemptions showed the strongest effect in increasing the demand for 
paid assistance at the expense of self-preparation and non-paid preparers. 
Ashley and Segal (1997) introduced a new measure they call absolute positive income (API), 
which is a total of all positive income reported on the tax return, plus the absolute value of all 
                                                 
9 Tax Year 2003 Taxpayer Usage Study (2004) 
10 This was a checklist question where the choices were to minimize taxes, to have the most correct return possible, and to 
minimize the total effort required. 
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expenses and deductions taken on the tax return. This, they claim, is a true measure of the 
tax related dollars, because deductions and expenses affect tax liability as much as income. 
Using data from the 1988 University of Michigan panel of Individual Tax Returns and a 
model modified from Christian, et al. (1993) and Long and Caudill (1987) they show 64.7 
percent of taxpayers filing a 1040 (long form) used a paid tax preparer as opposed to 46.8 
percent overall.11  Because filing a long form is indicative of schedules or attachments 
precluding the simpler 1040A or 1040EZ, this supports the finding that greater complexity 
leads to greater preparer usage.12 Contrary to prior research, they did not find a correlation 
between marginal tax rate or number of exemptions and paid preparer use.   
 In summary, the percentage of taxpayers using a paid preparer is increasing. This is 
likely due to the increasing complexity of the tax laws and the number of taxpayers who have 
businesses, investments, dependents or other circumstances that increase the cost of self-
preparation. With over 60 percent of returns being prepared professionally, more information 
about the relationship between taxpayers and tax preparers is important and timely. This 
dissertation will extend the research by evaluating if there are differences in demographics 
among taxpayers with different primary motivations for seeking a tax preparer. 
 
2.5 Tax Preparer Selection 
There is little information about how taxpayers choose a tax preparer. Scotchmer (1989 
p.192) notes determining the quality of a given tax preparer is complicated because no 
certification is required. “Essentially anyone,” she says, “can enter the market and try to find 
a clientele.” Her analytical model shows tax preparers are hired in order to reduce ambiguity. 
Bauman and Mantzke (2004) point out that many taxpayers don’t understand the tax law 
and, therefore, use tax preparers; this leaves the clients ill-equipped to evaluate the tax 
preparation services. 
Two papers looked at tax preparation selection specifically. McColl-Kennedy and 
Fetter (1999) used a mail survey with a final usable sample of 340 residents13 of a large 
Midwestern city to examine the difference in consumer involvement between professional 
and non-professional services. As predicted, people are more involved in choosing a movie 
or a restaurant for a special occasion than they are in choosing tax services or life insurance. 
Higher income participants were more involved in the choice of tax preparation services than 
lower income participants were (although still less than the movie or restaurant decisions).   
Moser, Colvard, and Austin (2000) used a mail survey with a final usable sample of 
528 consumers14 to determine attitudes towards advertising by accountants. The majority of 
respondents felt advertising was useful and would increase public information, but probably 
with a higher cost passed on to the consumer. In general, they were more willing to trust the 
opinion of a friend than advertising, but did not feel suspicious of or deceived by such 
advertising. They also felt, in general, reputation was more important than paying a low fee.   
                                                 
11 In 2003, according to Tax Year 2003 Taxpayer Usage Study (2004) 61 percent overall used a tax preparer; of 1040 filers 
it was 66 percent; for 1040A and 1040EZ filers it was 33 and 23 percent respectively. 
12 An alternative explanation is that paid preparers prepare the 1040 form even if the taxpayer qualifies for the 1040A or 
1040EZ. 
13 This was a 22 percent usable response rate. 
14 This was a 13.2 percent usable response rate. 
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 Turning to literature on how consumers choose other professionals, Crane and Lynch 
(1988) surveyed 100 randomly selected adults as to how they chose their physician and 
dentist. The top criteria were personal referral, physical facilities, demeanor, and the 
presence of other patients. Salisbury (1989) sent questionnaires to the newly registered 
patients of five doctor’s offices located in close proximity; they received 323 responses.15  
The most frequent considerations cited were nearest to home, recommended by someone, 
and other family members go there. Additionally, most participants discovered the practice 
when someone told them about it or they saw the building. Forty percent of respondents did 
not know anything about the practice before signing up; forty-nine percent asked family 
members, co-workers, previous doctors or neighbors about the practice.   
Motes, Huhmann, and Hill (1995) surveyed 950 adults16 from both small communities 
and large metro areas across the United States. They found wealthier consumers spent less 
time searching for a dental specialist than less wealthy consumers; there was no difference 
in search time for routine dental service. College educated consumers used fewer sources of 
information to find routine dental care than did less educated consumers. Consumers 
preferred personal sources of information to non-personal sources. The main sources for 
specialized dentists were referral service, direct visit or call, immediate family, and other 
relatives. The main sources for routine dental care were referral service, immediate family, 
and direct visit or call. 
 Bornstein, Marcus, and Cassidy (2000) surveyed 636 community residents at doctors’ 
offices, a public shopping area and a women’s organization meeting to assess which factors 
were most important when choosing a primary care physician. From a list of 23 items, the 
top five, in order, were board certification, neatness of doctor’s office, neatness of doctor’s 
personal appearance, recommendations from friends/family, and specialization.  
 This research indicates when consumers are unable to evaluate the skill level of a 
professional, they use convenience factors as proxies such as personal referrals, close 
proximity, or appearance of facilities. As with any other professional, taxpayers have 
difficulty assessing the competency of a tax preparer. Consequently, one would expect them 
to choose a tax preparer from factors they are able to assess, such as location, hours, 
personal referrals, certification, or price. With audit rates low and audits delayed by several 
years in most cases, it is hard for taxpayers to obtain an objective sense of whether or not 
their tax preparer is providing the service they desire. Additionally, many people either have 
no areas of ambiguity in their returns17 or the perception of low or no ambiguity.18  These 
people will likely believe tax services are homogeneous. This dissertation examines how 
closely tax preparers understand and provide the type of service their clientele desires. It 
also evaluates how well taxpayers choose tax preparers providing the type of service for 
which they are looking. 
 
                                                 
15 This was a 72 percent response rate. 
16 This was a 22.6 percent response rate. 
17 For example, those who receive only W-2 income probably have unambiguous returns. This may not be the case if their 
filing status, qualification for earned income credit, or deductions are unclear. 
18 Anecdotal evidence suggests many taxpayers believe there is one ‘right’ tax liability for their tax return. 
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2.6 Client Advocacy and Tax Minimization 
The tax literature indicates taxpayer advocacy is the same as tax minimization (Ayres et al. 
1989; Reckers et al. 1991). Mason and Levy (2001) developed a scale to measure “client 
advocacy,” and eight of the nine items on the instrument deal directly with tax minimization. 
Hatfield (2000 p.112) claims “advocacy results in finding positions that maximize the 
potential tax savings to the client.” Archival research shows professionally prepared returns 
have a greater refund due or smaller amount owed than self-prepared returns ceteris paribus 
(Christian et al. 1994). At the same time, Christensen (1992 p.65) tells us the “services the 
tax preparer gives the client are based on the preparer’s perceptions of client expectations.” 
Additionally, tax professionals are aware of the low chances of detection and audit their 
clients face (Fischer 2002). This allows them to take riskier positions than they otherwise 
would knowing the likelihood of audit is low19 (Kaplan, Reckers, West, and Boyd 1988). 
Thus, it seems reasonable to predict that most tax preparers believe their clients expect tax 
minimization efforts. 
This seems especially true of experienced tax professionals at the large firms. More 
experienced tax managers at one of the (then) Big Six firms showed greater tax minimization 
tendencies than less experienced managers (Pei, Reckers, and Wyndelts 1992). Tax 
professionals at the large firms have also exhibited confirmation bias when searching for tax 
law or precedent, which in turns leads to more tax aggressive positions and more confidence 
in the judicial success of those positions (Johnson 1993; Cloyd 1995; Cloyd and Spilker 
1999). Furthermore, increased advocacy is correlated with increased confirmation bias 
(Johnson 1993).  Increased advocacy is also correlated with increasing the weight of factors 
with favorable outcomes and decreasing the weight of factors with unfavorable outcomes 
(Davis and Mason 2003). 
Making a concerted effort towards tax minimization is denoted “aggression” in the tax 
literature. Early research assumed tax preparer aggression was due to client aggression; 
however, when that hypothesis was first tested, the results showed an inverse relationship 
(Milliron 1988; Duncan, LaRue, and Reckers 1989; Helleloid 1989). Subsequently, 
researchers found tax preparers increase compliance by resolving perceived ambiguity in 
straightforward tax items,20 but are tax aggressive where ambiguities exist in the law  
(Jackson, Milliron, and Toy 1988; Klepper and Nagin 1989; Roth, Scholz, and Witte 1989; 
Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin 1991; Schisler 1994). Still, research shows an important client 
can convince a tax preparer to sign a return with a more highly aggressive stance than the 
tax preparer would otherwise take (Reckers, Sanders, and Wyndelts 1991).  
Research shows what factors tend to increase tax aggression for different types of 
preparers. Increasing penalties tend to make CPAs more aggressive, but reduces the 
aggression of non-CPAs (Schnee, Bindon, and Ellis 1987).21  CPAs tend to be more 
aggressive than non-enrolled preparers (Ayres, Jackson, and Hite 1989). Tax professionals 
with more (and more successful) experience with the IRS tend to be more aggressive 
(Duncan, LaRue, and Reckers 1989). Cuccia, Hackenbrack and Nelson (1995) find tax 
practitioners exploit ambiguity in standards in favor of their client, but when the standards 
                                                 
19 This is known as playing the tax audit ‘lottery.’ 
20 A personal anecdote exemplifies this: many of my clients believed that if you performed services for less than $600, 
which does not require the hiring agent to produce and file a Form 1099, the money received was not taxable. This, of 
course, is clearly false, but is a perceived ambiguous area to some taxpayers. 
21 This study does not examine attorneys. 
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are not ambiguous they assess evidential support in a way that allows them to be just as 
aggressive. Spilker, Worsham and Prawitt (1999) found tax professionals use ambiguity in 
tax law to be aggressive in compliance situations, but they are more conservative in planning 
situations. They explicitly assume taxpayers’ primary motivation is tax minimization and, 
therefore, advocacy is tax aggressiveness.22
There is no research indicating tax preparers directly communicate with their clientele 
about risk preferences (Duncan, LaRue, and Reckers 1989; Schisler 1994). Indeed, the IRS 
proposed changes to Circular 23023 pointing out the need to inform clients of aggressive 
stances.24   
As evidence of this tendency towards aggression, a number of studies have 
examined tax liability on professionally prepared returns and self-prepared returns. Tax 
liability in 1983 was lower for professionally prepared returns than for self-prepared returns 
keeping income, filing status, number of dependents, self-employment, age and return 
complexity constant. Even when factoring in assumed tax preparation fees the results 
indicated using a tax preparer saves time and money (Long and Caudill 1987). Scotchmer 
(1989) used analytical modeling to show that when risk-neutral taxpayers lower their risk by 
choosing to seek professional advice in resolving ambiguity, tax revenues decline. Erard 
(1993) finds the use of tax professionals -- CPAs and attorneys in particular -- increases 
non-compliance.  Christian et al. (1994) used a two-step switching regression procedure 
developed to determine the existence of, and correct for, self-selection bias on the SOI 
Panel Data from 1983. They found paid-preparer returns have a larger refund or smaller 
payment due than self-prepared returns.  
Frischmann and Frees (1999) used the Ernst & Young/University of Michigan Tax 
Panel data containing information on tax preparer choice for six years and on preparation 
fees for three years. They classified choice factors into three categories: tax savings, time 
savings, and uncertainty. The overall results of the study show choosing a tax preparer 
relates to uncertainty reduction and time savings. The fees charged correlate with time 
savings and tax savings, but not with uncertainty reduction. Nichols and Price (2004) found 
representation during an audit reduces the overall final tax assessment charged to the 
taxpayer by 40 percent.  
This section indicates experienced tax preparers and enrolled professionals take 
aggressive stances more frequently than do other preparers.25 The literature does not make 
a distinction between CPAs from different sizes or types of firm. This dissertation extends 
the literature by making more distinctions between the various tax preparers: attorneys, 
CPAs at the Big Four, CPAs at other large firms, NTP firms, and individual or small company 
preparers. Tax aggression differences between firms is measured and compared. 
 
                                                 
22 Clients may be better served by matching tax preparation services to the client’s personal risk preferences, not just 
making the assumption that tax minimization is each taxpayer’s primary motivation. However, this dissertation will follow 
the convention of equating advocacy with tax minimization. 
23 Circular 230 is entitled, “Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled 
Agents, Enrolled Actuaries, and Appraisers before the Internal Revenue Service” and it governs the actions of those tax 
preparers that the IRS recognizes as representatives of taxpayers without the need for a power of attorney. 
24  Treasury Issues Rules To Increase Transparency and Halt Abusive Tax Avoidance Transactions (Office of Public 
Affairs 2003) 
25 Enrolled agents who are not CPAs or attorneys have passed an exam administered by the IRS; the IRS automatically 
enrolls CPAs and attorneys. 
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2.7 Service Qualities 
A review of the services marketing literature, as it pertains to tax preparation, can educate us 
on the way that taxpayers choose a tax preparer. Services marketing became a separate 
field of academic study in the 1970s (Shostack 1977; Berry and Parasuraman 1993; Fisk, 
Brown, and Bitner 1993). Services are different from products in several ways; this 
distinction made its way into the marketing literature in the 1960s (Rathmell 1966). Services 
have four specific and generally accepted qualities differentiating them from products: 
heterogeneity, inseparability, perishability, and intangibility (Fisk, Brown, and Bitner 1993; 
Zeithaml and Bitner 2003). Services are heterogeneous; each experience is likely to be 
slightly different from any other. In addition, services are inseparable from the purchase 
experience because they are frequently produced and consumed simultaneously as in 
receiving a haircut or massage. Services are perishable; they cannot be stocked, returned or 
resold. Services are also defined in marketing as intangible;26 they cannot be displayed, 
examined or easily communicated.   
Tax return preparation services have high levels of all these qualities. They are 
heterogeneous because the interaction between taxpayer and tax preparer is different for 
each consumer and each encounter. The interview required to prepare taxes is part of the 
production/consumption of the service as is the final debriefing after the return is complete. 
Tax return preparation services are perishable because there is a specific period to which 
they apply and they cannot be returned or reused. They are intangible; tax preparers make 
choices that are difficult to communicate fully to the taxpayer. One example of this is a tax 
preparer making an aggressive choice in an ambiguous situation; even if explained to the 
taxpayers fully, they would not be able to truly assess the level of risk without a high degree 
of experience with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and knowledge of the specific law. 
 Goods and services have various attributes consumers use when choosing between 
alternatives: search qualities, experience qualities, and credence qualities (Zeithaml and 
Bitner 2003). When searching for goods or services, consumers assess the search qualities 
-- those attributes that are assessable before purchase -- such as the packaging, texture, 
color, etc. Experience qualities are only assessable after experiencing the item or service, 
such as the taste of a particular brand of ice cream, the quality of service at a restaurant, 
ambience, and the neatness and grooming of employees.   
 Services tend to be high in the third category; credence qualities are not assessable 
even after purchase and consumption. A brief discussion of credence qualities is in Zeithaml 
and Bitner (2003). An example of a service high in credence qualities would be dental work. 
Usually, even after a filling is in place, patients are unable to assess the quality of the service 
because they are not qualified to do so. It may take years before the consumer is fully aware 
of the quality of dental work performed. Credence services rely on trust in many cases and 
are higher in risk to the consumer.27  
 Iacobucci (1992) put search, experience and credence qualities on continua. 
Participants rated 48 goods and services in relation to those continua. Participants rated tax 
                                                 
26 In this sense, the service is intangible until it is consumed or experienced. Although receiving a massage is a tangible 
experience, you cannot assess that until after the decision to buy has been made. Similarly, a tax return results in a tangible 
piece of paper, but the service itself is not a tangible good. 
27 Economics will point out that a market economy may mitigate this information asymmetry by means such as licensing or 
through consumer advocacy groups, such as Consumer Reports. This adds veracity to the claim that taxpayers may use 
certification (such as CPA or Enrolled Agent) or referrals as a proxy for quality. 
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services about halfway between experience and credence. Few tangible aspects of tax 
service are assessable ahead of time: office surroundings, employees’ mannerisms and 
dress, advertising and guarantees are examples. Experience qualities would likely consist of 
mannerisms of the tax person, sense of authority and empathy with the taxpayer, and the 
pleasantness of the front office staff. However, it may be several years before the IRS 
selects a tax return for audit, and a tax preparer may prepare many returns for a client before 
that happens, if it ever does. Thus, there is little external validation of the quality of a tax 
preparer's services; the client must rely on trust and other cues such as lack of audit, 
professional designation and price to proxy for quality.   
 Ostrom and Iacobucci (1995) examine a number of factors about services. They use 
four service industries high in credence factors and four low in credence factors on their 
instrument. Tax preparation was one of the four high credence services. The results from 
this study show consumers are less price sensitive with high credence services and the 
authors conjecture price proxies for quality when consumers have no other measure.   
 If this conjecture holds true, then taxpayers may believe highly paid tax preparers 
prepare returns that are more accurate without being aware of the differences in 
aggressiveness between preparers. However, this is probably a poor measure as CPAs are 
not necessarily more accurate than non-CPAs and there is no correlation between fees and 
accuracy (Ashton 2000). When faced with the task of finding and trying to evaluate a service, 
such as tax preparation services, a consumer may take the first suitable alternative28 instead 
of spending time and resources searching for many alternatives (Zeithaml and Bitner 2003). 
 Scotchmer (1989) noted tax preparers can be extremely unqualified, can be highly 
qualified CPAs and attorneys, or can be anything in between. Bauman and Mantzke (2004 
p.50) refer to low end tax practitioners with little training or education as “fly-by-night” 
preparers. There is no federal regulation on who can prepare tax returns for a fee. 
Scotchmer (1989) points out that insurance or guarantees would help reduce the uncertainty 
of the quality of the preparer, but this is complicated because the preparer only sees the 
information the taxpayer wishes to provide and, therefore, moral hazard prohibits complete 
guarantees.  
 Taxpayers cannot evaluate tax services objectively; the Internal Revenue Code is 
objective only insofar as it is not ambiguous. Furthermore, taxpayers who seek professional 
help are those unfamiliar with tax law and thus uniquely unqualified to evaluate those 
services (Bauman and Mantzke 2004).  Timely filing, competitive fees and lack of audit are 
also only partial measures of the quality of a tax return (Christensen 1992). This dissertation 
adds to the literature by examining how well each of the different types of tax preparers 
know what their clients want as well as how well taxpayers with differing motivations select 
their tax preparer based on these dimensions. 
 
2.8 Client Expectations 
Taxpayers want their tax returns to be accurate. Sixty-three percent of taxpayers in 
Yankelovich (1984) and 70 percent of taxpayers in Collins, Milliron and Toy (1990) listed 
accuracy as their primary reason for hiring a tax preparer. Hite and McGill (1992) found tax 
professionals are more aggressive than their clients want them to be; clients disagreeing 
                                                 
28 This is known in the psychology literature as “satisficing.” 
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with aggressive advice are more likely to change service providers than clients disagreeing 
with conservative advice. Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) found that most taxpayers wanted 
the “low risk, no fuss” preparer who was honest and risk averse.  Considering that the Tax 
Gap in 2001 was around $300 billion, taking aggressive stances can have a significant 
impact on public finance (GAO 2005).  Erard (1993) points out that tax practitioners have an 
enormous influence on the amount of compliance their clients exhibit. 
 Christensen (1992) used preparers and clients from a large international accounting 
firm as survey participants. She sent surveys to 441 clients and the corresponding 31 tax 
preparers with a 54 and 100 percent response rate respectively. She found differences 
between client expectations and preparers’ perceptions of those expectations had a direct 
impact on satisfaction. Overall, clients expect more tax planning advice and strategies, and 
they perceive the tax preparer as having a poor understanding of their desires. The two 
largest differences were in the clients’ desire to avoid audit and in communication skills.   
 Taxpayers seem to disconnect with their tax return after hiring a tax preparer. 
Evidence to support this comes from two studies. In the first, taxpayers who use paid 
preparers are less aware of their marginal tax rate than those who do not, showing they 
were less cognitively involved with the return than taxpayers who self-prepared returns 
(Rupert and Fischer 1995).  Secondly, Tan (1999) found that taxpayers accepted the advice 
of their preparer regardless of whether it was aggressive or conservative.  Such advice did 
not affect the taxpayer’s intention to continue or terminate the relationship. In addition, 
Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) found that 85 percent of taxpayers surveyed thought all their 
deductions were legitimate, even though over one third did not feel confident about their 
knowledge of tax matters.  Seven percent had no idea if their deductions were legitimate or 
not because they left it up to someone else to do. 
Schisler and Galbreath (2000) used attribution theory in an experimental setting to show 
taxpayer-participants viewed an IRS audit as failure on the part of the tax preparer, even if 
the audit outcome was favorable. Furthermore, the taxpayer-participants were less likely to 
return to that preparer after audit than if they were not audited, regardless of whether the 
outcome was favorable or not. In their study, taking an ambiguous deduction was part of the 
instrument for all participants, but the researchers did initially ask if the participants would be 
likely to take the deduction. No significant difference existed between those who would have 
taken the deduction and those who would not have when blame was the dependent variable. 
This shows taxpayers rely heavily on the recommendations of their tax preparers, and will 
consequently hold them responsible for the decisions made.   
 Zeithaml and Bitner (2003) identified five factors affecting clients’ definition of 
adequate service. The first is transitory service intensifiers -- short-term factors increasing 
the desire for responsiveness and timeliness. The April 15 deadline for personal tax filing 
would be an example of this. Second, perceived service alternatives will affect client 
expectations of service quality. The expectation of good service increases when the 
taxpayer perceives many alternatives. This may include self-preparation. For clients with 
extremely complicated returns, there are fewer alternatives to having a particular provider, 
and they are likely to be more easily satisfied. Third is the customer’s self-perceived service 
role. A taxpayer who is more involved in the interview and decision process will take more 
personal responsibility for satisfaction and be less critical of the tax preparer. Fourth, 
situation factors can influence expectations; for example, taxpayers are more likely to 
demand high quality service on routine items, but be more forgiving of one-time or unusual 
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transactions they present to their tax preparer. Finally, predicted service plays a role in client 
expectations. Recent experience with a tax preparer or expectations developed from 
advertising influence a client's perception of adequate service. 
 To summarize, taxpayers with higher incomes or more complex returns are more 
likely to seek out paid tax preparation services than other taxpayers. There is no research 
showing how those taxpayers find their tax preparers or what criteria they use; however, 
there is evidence to suggest over half of those seeking paid preparers have accuracy as 
their main goal and being the subject of a tax audit is viewed as failure on the part of the tax 
preparer. Finally, the definition of adequate service varies greatly from person to person. I 
examine the different clienteles to see if tax preparers understand their clients' expectations. 
I also examine the demographics of the taxpayers to see if differing groups have different 
motivations for hiring a tax preparer. 
2.9 Summary 
To add to the existing literature on the relationship between taxpayers and tax preparers, I 
examine that relationship in greater detail. I also use instruments developed recently and 
rigorously to analyze both client motivations in seeking professional tax preparation and 
levels of client advocacy in various types of tax professionals. These instruments should 
measure client motivations and advocacy more accurately than checklists or open-ended 
questions. This area of research is important since tax compliance costs a great deal in both 
time and money and, therefore, is an important part of the way in which the tax system 
affects taxpayers. 
 General economic theory suggests that eventually the market becomes efficient and 
purchasers effectively seek out providers offering the desired services. One broad question 
in this area is why a difference between taxpayer motivation and what tax preparers provide 
persists. There are several possible answers to this question. It is possible that the market 
has become efficient. Because most of the studies of tax preparers used the Big Four 
accounting firms while taxpayers have come from demographics fitting the population at 
large, it is possible that the expectation gap does not truly exist, but is just a construct of 
mismatched samples. Perhaps different clienteles are efficiently seeking out appropriate 
service providers but researchers have not yet documented this. However, Christensen 
(1992) found a gap between the tax preparers of a large international firm and their specific 
clients, making this scenario unlikely.   
 Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) found that Australian taxpayers are finding tax 
professionals who meet their desires.  However, this is based on the taxpayers’ perceptions 
of the qualities their tax professionals possess. It is reasonable to assume that if taxpayers 
desire a particular quality in a tax professional, and continue to use that person’s services, 
they would also believe that the professional has that desired quality (or they would change 
professionals). Their research does not show, however, if that perception is true, or in other 
words, if an expectation gap exists. 
 This dissertation extends Christensen’s (1992) findings by using many levels of tax 
professional, not just those in the Big Four. It also extends Sakurai and Braithwaite’s (2001) 
findings by measuring differences in taxpayer motivations and client advocacy between 
matched sets of tax professionals and their clients to see if there is a gap.   
 Another possibility is the market is too young to have become efficient. The income 
tax system has been in place for less than 100 years; it has only affected the majority of the 
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population since World War II. With most taxpayers only seeking out this service once a 
year, and with it being a high credence service, it may not have had enough cycles to clear 
effectively. Although this does not seem likely, if this is the case, then this dissertation should 
show a lower expectation gap than Christensen (1992) found as more than a decade has 
elapsed between the two studies. Mason and Garrett-Levy (2004) recently ran an 
experiment that showed lower levels of aggressiveness than expected among Big Four tax 
professionals which may indicate that previously detected levels of tax aggression are 
declining to better match taxpayers’ desires. 
 Finally, a lack of understanding on the part of both parties – taxpayers and tax 
preparers – and a lack of explicit communication about risk preferences compounded with 
low audit rates and, thus, low evaluative feedback allow the discrepancy to persist. I feel this 
is the most likely scenario. If this were the case, then those firms with the greatest resources 
would have the smallest gaps, as they are the ones in a position to do market research to 
find out what their clientele want. I examine the gap for all sizes of firms. 
 If clients prefer to minimize audits and to have accurate tax returns, at the expense of 
an increase in taxes, then less aggressive tax reporting would be cost effective and reduce 
overall risk. The GAO has made a call for making use of a variety of means to reduce the 
Tax Gap. Without such reduction, it claims that the fiscal sustainability of the country is in 
jeopardy (GAO 2005).  This research may help to increase conservative interpretations by 
tax professionals is ambiguous situations, thereby effecting one small way to help reduce the 
Tax Gap. I would also encourage further research in this area to focus on the varying 
clienteles with more degrees of differentiation than previously shown.   
 Additionally, this dissertation shows the results of a validly developed scale to 
measure taxpayer motivation. The addition of this scale to the tax research literature will 
facilitate future research on taxpayer motivation. 
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Chapter 3 Taxpayer Priorities Instrument Development 
3.1 Introduction 
Mason and Levy (2001p. 82-83) called for additional scales to be developed to provide 
accounting researchers with an arsenal of instruments that have been tested for validity.  The 
use of these scales by different researchers in different settings will, over time, increase the 
generalizability of consistent research findings and enrich accounting research.  
 Roberts (1998) claims that tax accounting academics have a competitive advantage 
over economists in tax-related judgment and decision making research due to their in-depth 
technical knowledge of taxes and research ability with cognitive psychology.  However, he 
also recommends that valid scales and instruments need to be developed to exploit this 
advantage. Valid scales increase the reliability of the experiment and make sure that each 
researcher is measuring the construct in a similar manner, thus improving the generalizability 
of results.   
 The development of such a scale as a part of this dissertation is a methodological 
contribution to the accounting research community. Such a scale will facilitate future research 
on taxpayer motivation in hiring tax professionals. 
 A summary of the literature over the past twenty years shows that the motivations of 
taxpayers hiring tax preparers can be categorized: accuracy, audit avoidance, money 
savings, time savings, having a professional to stand between the taxpayer and the IRS 
either as a form of insurance or to avoid the stress of dealing directly with the IRS 
(Yankelovich 1984; Scotchmer 1989; Collins, Milliron, and Toy 1990; Christensen 1992; 
Dubin et al. 1992; Hite, Stock, and Cloyd 1992; Sakurai and Braithwaite 2001; Internal 
Revenue Service 2002; Hite and Hasseldine 2003; IRS Oversight Board 2004; Nichols and 
Price 2004).   
 The various studies that have asked taxpayers their preferences have done so either 
with an open-ended question (Yankelovich 1984), or with a list from which the taxpayer 
selected an item (Collins et al. 1990; Christensen 1992). Yet the problem is not as simple as 
choosing an item from a list. A taxpayer may want an accurate return in order to reduce audit 
probability, yet these two items have been treated separately in the past. Additionally, tax 
minimization and accuracy are probably both important to taxpayers, but there is an implicit 
tradeoff between the two. While this research has yielded interesting results, what is needed 
is a reliable, tested scale in order to assure that the construct of interest is being consistently 
measured. 
3.2 Define the Construct 
According to two books recently written on scale development, the first step in scale 
development is to clearly define the construct (DeVellis 2003; Netemeyer, Bearden, and 
Sharma 2003).  Both of these books suggest that to develop a strong theoretical foundation 
for the construct, the antecedents and effects be considered. In addition, an investigation of 
the literature will determine if a similar measure already exists and can be adapted to the 
purpose at hand. No similar measure was found, with the exception of the questionnaires 
previously mentioned, which do not use a scale. Questions taken from Yankelovich (1984), 
Collins, et al (1990), and Christensen (1992) among other papers figured prominently in the 
development of this scale. 
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 Figure 3-1 was developed as part of this dissertation to show how taxpayers evaluate 
and select tax professionals. The left hand side of the figure shows the criteria upon which 
taxpayers are able to evaluate tax professionals’ services. These criteria include those things 
that a taxpayer can observe and evaluate such as fees, certification, and advertising. This list 
is not meant to be comprehensive, but to provide an idea of those qualities that are 
accessible and assessable by an average taxpayer. On the right side are the traits found 
desirable by taxpayers as a result of this scale development process. If the taxpayer is never 
audited29 there is never an opportunity to determine if tax minimization, accuracy, etcetera 
were a function of the professionals’ efforts.30  
 Understanding the motivations, shown in the right hand side of Figure 3-1, is a 
significant part of this dissertation. The creation of a scale, which enables tax researchers to 
accurately measure and define that motivation, is the subject of this section of the 
dissertation. Having developed the construct, the next step is generating a list of questions. 
3.3 Generate a List of Items 
Devillis (2003) claims that the ideal in generating an initial item list for a scale is to assume 
that the universe of potential questions is infinite and that the list generated is a random 
selection of those questions.  This is impossible, of course, but he recommends keeping 
those criteria in mind when generating the list. Netemeyer, et al. (2003) reiterate that 
concept, but then say that in practice items are usually generated by selecting questions from 
the literature and from author generation.  These are the methods I used to create the initial 
list shown in Figure 3-2. The items listed will be given to participants and they will be asked 
to respond on a Likert-type scale how much they agree with each one. For this reason, they 
are referred to as questions hereafter. 
 Some of the questions have been modified from Yankelovich et al. (1984), Collins et 
al. (1990), and Christensen (1992). Other questions I generated to complete the areas and to 
juxtapose each criterion against the others. I chose more categories than I expected factor 
analysis would show as final orthogonal motivations. When factor analysis and principal 
components analysis were performed, some of the categories merged, such as tax 
minimization and money savings. However, I left all categories cited in the literature in the 
initial survey so that a large set of the most common motivations was covered in the first 
analysis of the instrument. These were all measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale 
with endpoints of “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree.” 
3.4 Face Validity 
Netemeyer et al. (2003 p.12) claim face validity induces the “cooperation of the respondents 
via ease of use, proper reading level, clarity, easily read instructions, and easy-to-use 
response formats.”  They say the instrument should not only be valid but it should look valid. 
DeVillis (2003) counters by arguing there is the question of to whom it should look valid. He 
believes that just because a subject does not know the purpose of the question that does not 
stop the question from being valid. 
                                                 
29 Audit rates have consistently been under 4% for all classes of individual taxpayers since at least 1998 as per IRS 
statistics. (Source http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/). Additionally, audit rates declined steadily from 1996 to a low of an average 
audit rate of .49% in 2000 (White 2001). 
30 A lack of audit and similarity to previous years’ tax liability may provide some information to the taxpayer; however, 
exactly what type of and how accurate a signal it would be is indeterminable. 
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 Both books, however, suggest having a panel of experts review the initial list of 
questions to make sure they are not ambiguous, do not use jargon, are clearly related to the 
construct to which they are assigned, and perhaps to suggest alternative wordings or 
questions as well. My panel of experts consisted of five tax professors and three tax 
professionals. 
 After receiving feedback from the expert panel, two questions were eliminated, several 
were reworded and three were added to the initial list. The length of each question was 
examined and some were shortened. The difficulty of the words was also examined and 
technical language was sometimes replaced with shorter, simpler words. Finally, sets of 
questions that could be asked using the same stem were identified and rewritten to that end. 
An instrument was then developed and given to the first round of participants. This 
instrument is represented by Figure 3-3. 
3.5 Pilot Testing and Analysis 
With an initial item pool of 76 questions, an appropriate sample size for the initial data 
collection is 200-385 participants (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988; Clark and 
Watson 1998).   
 It is necessary that these participants are acquired from the target population (DeVellis 
2003; Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma 2003).  To find the pool of taxpayers, I put the 
round-one survey on a website and emailed professors, friends, and students with the URLs 
of the survey.31  I asked each of them to pass the URLs along to organizations to which they 
belong and to friends and family with the instructions that anyone who had their taxes 
professionally prepared would qualify to complete the survey.  
 Six hundred sixty-one people attempted to do the survey, however 17 were not eligible 
because they had not had their taxes professionally prepared in the last five years. Another 
294 quit before they were done, and two were dropped for giving the same answer to all 76 
questions. This left a final usable sample of 348 participants, which is 52.6 percent of the 
participants who attempted to complete the survey. A response rate is not known because 
the invitation to complete the survey was done in an informal manner to acquire the highest 
number of participants possible. 
 The demographics of the round-one participants are provided in Table 3.1. Accessing 
Tax Year 2003 Taxpayer Usage Study Report Number 13 (SOI), I compared the 
demographics of my sample to that of 2003 taxpayers. Not all demographic items are 
collected from the IRS and, therefore, not all demographic comparisons can be made. 
Examining those that can, I found my sample was skewed a bit towards younger taxpayers,32 
higher incomes,33 and married taxpayers.34 Finally, SOI data show 37.1 percent of taxpayers 
with dependent children claimed on their returns compared to 37.2 percent in my sample. 
However, my sample demographics match national taxpayer statistics fairly closely.   
                                                 
31 Two editions of the same survey were created. The questions are randomized within each page, but the order of the pages 
is reversed in the two surveys. The combination should eliminate any order effects that may occur. 
32 IRS shows 12.69 percent of returns have one filer over age 65; my sample shows 4.6 percent of participants were over 
65. 
33 IRS data show 70.6 percent of filers with less than $50,000 income; my survey shows 37 percent. IRS shows 20.6 
percent between $50-100,000; my survey shows 31 percent. IRS shows 8.8 percent over $100,000; my survey shows 32 
percent. 
34 The SOI data show 38.7 percent of filers are Married Filing Joint, compared to 49 percent of my sample.   
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 Exploratory factor analysis was used on the data to interpret the factors, determine 
which items fit into each factor, and to create a limited number of factors. (Dawes 1987). 
After examining the Eigenvalues and differences between Eigenvalues in the principal 
components analysis, it was decided to keep four categories. These are described as money 
savings, time savings, accuracy, and protection from, or avoidance of, the IRS.35   
The original 76 questions were subjected to exploratory factor analysis. Twenty questions 
with loadings above .3 on two factors and three questions with loadings above .2 on three 
factors were eliminated first. The remaining 53 items were subjected to exploratory factor 
analysis again. Four factors were retained and the items examined for minimum loading 
values. Nineteen items were eliminated for loading with values above .2 on more than one 
factor. Another exploratory factor analysis was run on the remaining 34 questions and the 
process repeated. Two questions were eliminated in this round for loading on two factors with 
a greater than .2 value and five questions were eliminated for having primary loadings under 
.45. This resulted in 27 remaining questions in four categories. The inter-item reliability was 
evaluated with coefficient alpha resulting in correlations ranging from .90 for time savings 
down to .78 for accuracy.36    
 As an incentive to complete this survey, I offered to donate to the charities that 
received the most votes.37   
3.6 Final Testing and Analysis 
A second round of responses using the final item pool was collected. This is shown in Figure 
3.4. One hundred and eighty participants attempted to complete the survey but 40 were not 
eligible, since they had not had their taxes completed by a tax professional at least once in 
the past five years. Complete data were collected from 140 participants, which is 77.8 
percent of those who attempted it. As in the first round, a response rate is unknown. This 
data were analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis and coefficient alpha.   
 Participants were solicited as in the previous round. Participants were asked not to 
complete the survey if they had participated in the first. The demographics of this sample are 
provided in Table 3-2. As in the first round, there are differences between my participants 
and national averages. Similar to the first round, my sample is younger, wealthier, and 
contains more married people.38 There is no reason to assume that the variances would 
change the validity of the instrument. Because the IRS statistics cover all filers, not just the 
ones who use tax preparers, having wealthier respondents may actually increase the validity 
of the instrument since there is a correlation between income and tax preparer use.  
                                                 
35 These categories correspond somewhat to the ones Sakurai and Braithwaite (2001) found using factor analysis for 
Australian taxpayers: Low risk/no fuss, cautious minimization/conflict avoidance, creative accounting/aggressive 
minimization.  However, Sakurai and Braithwaite did not ask questions that would have measured the importance of 
money savings or time savings directly.  
36 A coefficient alpha that is too high (above .95) shows that the scale contains redundancies. The lower acceptable end is 
usually recognized as being about .70, but some academic research accepts scales with coefficient alphas around .60. 
37 For round one, 132 people chose American Red Cross, 40 people chose PetsMart Charities, 34 chose March of Dimes, 
31 chose Marine Toys For Tots, 26 chose UNICEF, 18 chose American Civil Liberties Union, 17 chose Goodwill, and 48 
chose to name their own, but that resulted in no more than six for any particular charity. Accordingly, $100 was sent to the 
American Red Cross and $50 each to PetsMart Charities and March of Dimes. 
38 Compared to the same IRS statistics as above, I had 3.6 percent above 65 versus 12.7 percent; 53.4 percent with income 
above $50,000 versus 29.4 percent; 47.7 percent married versus 38.7 percent 
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 Exploratory factor analysis is useful in the scale development stage as it allows many 
questions to be reduced to a more manageable set of factors. However, it is only a 
preliminary step. Confirmatory factor analysis is needed to evaluate and refine the scale 
(Gerbing and Anderson 1988).  Confirmatory factor analysis was performed to refine the 
scale resulting in a 14-item scale that measures four underlying concepts. Those concepts 
are time savings, money savings, accuracy or compliance with law, and protection from, or 
avoidance of, the IRS.   
 Of the 27 questions with which I began the second round, one was eliminated 
because it changed factors when confirmatory factor analysis was run. Two more were 
eliminated because they increased the reliability score. Confirmatory factor analysis was run 
again with the remaining 24 questions. One more question was eliminated because of a high 
correlation with another question that had a higher loading factor. Two questions were 
eliminated because they had low loading factors and the reliability score increased when they 
were eliminated. Confirmatory factor analysis was run a third time with the 21 questions 
remaining. In an effort to pare the scale down to a parsimonious number of questions, four 
more were eliminated that had loading factors that were low relative to the others in that 
factor. Confirmatory factor analysis was run again on the remaining 17 questions. One 
question in the “save time” factor was eliminated because of high inter-item correlation and 
because eliminating it did not reduce coefficient alpha substantially. Similarly, one item was 
eliminated from each of the factors described as “avoidance of, or protection from, the IRS” 
and “accuracy or compliance with law.”   
 The final scale, shown in Figure 3.5, consists of 14 items. There are three items 
related to accuracy or compliance with the law; this construct is referred to as “accuracy” for 
the rest of this dissertation. There are also three items related to saving money. There are 
four items related to protection from, or avoidance of, the IRS; this construct is hereafter 
referred to as “IRS.” The remaining four items refer to saving time.   
 Yankelovich, Skelly and White (1984 p.4) were instructed to ask taxpayers why they 
had their taxes professionally prepared, but not to read the prompts aloud.  They then 
categorized the responses as best they could. The top answer, “the forms/instructions were 
too complicated/afraid I’d make mistake” does not directly correspond to any of the 
categories in my final scale. It might reflect a desire for accuracy, however. The second most 
frequent answer was “it is just habit to have someone else prepare it” does not speak to 
motivation; there must have been a reason for the habit to start, but it is not addressed in this 
comment. Thus, there is no correspondence between it and my final scale. The third most 
frequent category was “I hoped the tax preparer would be able to save me some money” 
corresponds directly to the “saving money” category in my final scale. The next one, “I didn’t 
have enough time to do it myself/too busy,” corresponds directly to “saving time.” The 
remaining items in Yankelovich et al., were either vague (i.e. “unusual or complicated 
circumstances”) or had a minimal response rate (one percent).  
 Collins, Milliron and Toy (1990 p.23) asked taxpayers which best describes their 
feelings about why they hire a tax preparer.  The choices were, “to minimize taxes,” “to have 
the most correct return possible,” and “to minimize the total effort required.” None of the 
questions on my scale are that direct, but these three choices do correspond to three of the 
four categories discovered through factor analysis: saving money, accuracy, and saving time. 
 Christensen (1992 p.82-83) asked her participants to rank four items: “saving money 
on taxes,” “reducing the chances of being audited,” “accuracy of the tax return” and “fee paid 
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for the tax service.”  Although there were statements in the first round regarding reducing 
chances of being audited, these did not end up on the final instrument. The fee paid for tax 
service in ambiguous: it could be that they feel the fee saves them money, saves them time, 
is worth accurate service, is insurance against audit, etc. Therefore, it was not part of the 
instrument. However, “saving money” and “accuracy” were two of the categories that resulted 
from the scale development process. 
 My final scale has four categories. Saving time is similar to questions found in 
Yankelovich et al. (1984) and Collins et al. (1990). Saving money is similar to questions 
found in Yankelovich et al. (1984), Collins et al. (1990) and Christensen (1992). Accuracy is 
similar to questions found in Collins et al. (1990) and Christensen (1992). IRS is a construct 
that was discovered in the scale development process that is not reflected in these prior 
studies. However, each of these three studies approached this topic in a different area. For 
instance, in Yankelovich et al. (1984) six percent of the time taxpayers failed to take a 
deduction to which they were entitled; they did so for fear of audit. Collins et al (1990) asked 
participants how they would feel about receiving an audit notice from the IRS, but did not tie it 
to motivation. Christensen (1992) asked a series of 12 questions about expected and actual 
tax preparer behavior including one about reducing chance of audit.   
 A similar incentive of paying the most popular charities was provided for round two.39
3.7 Summary 
In creating my scale, I first searched for antecedents of the construct in the literature and 
through analytical brainstorming. I then generated a list of items drawn from the literature and 
created to reflect each potential dimension of the construct. This was shown to a panel of 
experts and revised accordingly.    
 The first round analyzed the data from 348 participants using exploratory factor 
analysis and coefficient alpha. The remaining questions were then subjected to a second 
round of data collection. This round produced 140 responses that were analyzed using 
confirmatory factor analysis and coefficient alpha. 
 The result is a tested, verifiable scale created by using members of the target 
population. This scale is used in the final instrument that is given to both tax professionals 
and taxpayers. As recommended with any scale, factor analysis and coefficient alpha are run 
with each use. 
 Although this scale extends the literature by providing another tool with which to 
examine the taxpayer-tax preparer relationship, it is limited by the number of constructs that it 
actually measures.  Although I selected the motivations I measured from the literature 
(saving time, saving money, complying with the law and filing an accurate return, avoidance 
of or protection from the IRS), it is possible that there are completely different motivations for 
hiring a tax professional that have not been addressed. 
                                                 
39 Forty-four people chose the American Cancer Society, 36 people chose the Humane Society of the United States 
(HSUS), 23 people chose Big Brothers/Big Sisters, 21 people chose American Red Cross, 6 people chose Reading is 
Fundamental, and 5 chose to name their own, but none were the same, and 3 finished the survey but did not answer that 
question. Accordingly, $75 was sent to the American Cancer Society and $25 each to Humane Society of the United States 
and Big Brothers/Big Sisters.  
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Table 3-1 Demographics in First Round of Scale Development 
Panel 1  - Age1 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total2 
Number 77 78 42 95 37 16 345 
Percent 22.3  22.6  12.2  27.5  10.7  4.6  100.0  
National3 35.34 14.2 16.0 13.4 8.6 12.4 100.05 
  Panel 2 – Gender6 
 Male Female Total2 
Number 163 181 344 
Percent 47.4 52.6  100.0  
National7 49.1 50.9 100.0 
Panel 3 – Education8 
 Less than High 
School 
High School Some College9 Bachelor 
Degree 
Master Degree Doctorate 
 
Total2 
Number 1 10 110 92 80 52 345 
Percent 0.3 2.9 31.9 26.7 23.2 15.1 100.0  
National7 19.6 28.6 27.3 15.5 8.9 100.05 
Panel 4 – IRS Contact 
 Never 
Contacted 
Received a Letter Office Audit Field Audit Total2 
Number 242 77 18 7 344 
Percent 70.3 22.4 5.2 2.0 100.0  
Panel 5 – Household Income10 
 < $25,000 $25,000 to < 
$50,000 
$50,000 to < 
$100,000 
$100,000 + Total2 
Number 65 53 99 102 319 
Percent 20.4 16.6 31.0 32.0 100.0  
National11 45.8 25.4 20.5 8.3 100.0 
Panel 6 – Filing Status12 
 Single Married 
Filing Joint 
Married Filing 
Separately 
Head of 
Household 
Qualifying 
Widow(er) 
Total2 
Number 145 168 6 21 3 343 
Percent 42.3 49.0 1.7 6.1 0.9 100.0  
National13 44.0 39.4 16.6 100.0 
Panel 7 – Ethnicity14 
 White/ 
Caucasian 
Black/ African 
American 
Latino Native American Asian Other Total2 
Number 300 18 3 1 12 3 337 
Percent 89.0 5.3  0.9 0.3 3.6 0.9  100.0  
National15 69.1 12.3 12.5 0.9 3.6 1.6 100.0 
Panel 8 – Dependent Children 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more Total2 
Number 215 52 52 16 5 2 342 
Percent 62.9  15.2 15.2 4.7 1.5 0.6  100.0  
This table shows the demographics from the first round of scale development.  There were 348 participants overall.  The actual 
demographics are given in absolute numbers and in percentages.  They are compared to national statistics where such statistics were 
available. 
1This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 67.7).  
Specifically, my sample is weighted towards 24-34 and 45-64 year old taxpayers at the expense of the other age groups. 
2 Totals do not add to 348 because some participants chose “prefer not to answer” for some questions. 
3 Source: Census Bureau Data from Census Year 2000. The first cell is for ages 0-24. 
4 Because the Census Bureau Data includes persons of all ages, but few children file their own returns, this category is not compared 
using Chi-Square.  A weighted average of the remaining categories is tested. 
5 Does not add to 100.0 because of rounding. 
6This distribution is not different than would be expected based on Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = .405). 
7 Source: Census Bureau Data from Census Year 2000. 
8 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square =508.4).  
Specifically, my sample includes more college educated people at all levels, and fewer people with only a high school degree or less.9 
Includes persons with Associate’s Degree. 
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10 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Statistics of Income (Chi-Square = 287.1).  
Specifically, more participants have incomes higher than $50,000 and fewer have less than that. 
11 Source: Statistics of Income Table 1.--Individual Income Tax, All Returns: Sources of Income and Adjustments, by Size of Adjusted 
Gross Income, Fiscal Year 2002. 
12 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Statistics of Income (Chi-Square = 21.0).  
Specifically, it is weighted towards taxpayers filing under the “Married Filing Joint” status. 
13 Source: IRS, Statistics of Income, Individual Complete Report 2002, Publication 1304, February 2005. 
14 This distribution is significantly different that the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 71.3).  
Specifically, more Caucasian, and fewer of all other ethnicities, are represented in my sample than national averages. 
15 Source: Statistics of Income Table 1.--Individual Income Tax, All Returns: Sources of Income and Adjustments, by Size of Adjusted 
Gross Income, Fiscal Year 2002. 
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Table 3-2 Demographics in Second Round of Scale Development 
Panel 1  - Age1 
 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total2 
Number 46 21 16 31 18 5 137 
Percent 33.6 15.3 11.7 22.6 13.1 3.6 100.0 
National3 35.34 14.2 16.0 13.4 8.6 12.4 100.05 
  Panel 2 – Gender6 
 Male Female Total2 
Number 76 58 134 
Percent 56.7 43.3 100.0 
National7 49.1 50.9 100.0 
Panel 3 – Education8 
 Less than 
High School 
High School Some College9 Bachelor 
Degree 
Master 
Degree 
Doctorate 
 
Total2 
Number 0 6 61 28 23 18 136 
Percent 0.0 4.4 44.9 20.6 16.9 13.2 100.0 
National3 19.6 28.6 27.3 15.5 8.9  100.05 
Panel 4 – IRS Contact 
 Never 
Contacted 
Received a Letter Office Audit Field Audit Total2 
Number 100 25 8 1 134 
Percent 74.6 18.7 6.0 0.7 100.0 
Panel 5 – Household Income10 
 < $25,000 $25,000 to < 
$50,000 
$50,000 to < 
$100,000 
$100,000 + Total2 
Number 31 25 32 32 120 
Percent 25.8 20.8 26.7 26.7 100.0 
National11 45.8 25.4 20.5 8.3 100.0 
Panel 6 – Filing Status12 
 Single Married 
Filing 
Joint 
Married 
Filing 
Separately 
Head of Household Qualifying 
Widow(er) 
Total2 
Number 63 63 2 4 0 132 
Percent 47.7 47.7 1.5 3.0 0.0 100.0 
National13 44.0 39.4 16.6 100.0 
Panel 7 – Ethnicity14 
 White/ 
Caucasian 
Black/ 
African 
American 
Latino Native 
American 
Asian Other Total2 
Number 120 8 0 0 1 4 133 
Percent 90.2 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.0 100.0 
National7 69.1 12.3 12.5 0.9 3.6 1.6 100.0 
Panel 8 – Dependent Children 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more Total2 
Number 76 21 26 6 3 0 132 
Percent 57.6 15.9 19.7 4.5 2.3 0.0 100.0 
This table shows the demographics from the second round of scale development.  There were 138 participants overall.  
The actual demographics are given in absolute numbers and in percentages.  They are compared to national statistics 
where such statistics were available. 
1This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 21.7).  
Specifically, my sample is weighted towards 24-34 and 45-64 year old taxpayers at the expense of the other age groups. 
2 Totals do not add to 138 because some participants chose “prefer not to answer” for some questions. 
3 Source: Census Bureau Data from Census Year 2000. The first cell is for ages 0-24. 
4 Because the Census Bureau Data includes persons of all ages, but few children file their own returns, this category is not compared 
using Chi-Square.  A weighted average of the remaining categories is tested. 
5 Does not add to 100.0 because of rounding. 
6This distribution is significantly different than would be expected based on Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square =3.1).  Specifically there 
were more male and fewer female participants. 
7 Source: Census Bureau Data from Census Year 2000. 
8 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 140.7).  
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Specifically, my sample includes more college educated people at all levels, and fewer people with only a high school degree or less. 
9 Includes persons with Associate’s Degree. 
10 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Statistics of Income (Chi-Square = 62.1).  
Specifically, more participants have incomes higher than $50,000 and fewer have less than that. 
11 Source: Statistics of Income Table 1.--Individual Income Tax, All Returns: Sources of Income and Adjustments, by Size of Adjusted 
Gross Income, Fiscal Year 2002. 
12 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Statistics of Income (Chi-Square = 14.4).  
Specifically, it is weighted towards taxpayers filing under the “Single” and “Married Filing Joint” statuses. 
13 Source: IRS, Statistics of Income, Individual Complete Report 2002, Publication 1304, February 2005. 
14 This distribution is significantly different that the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 27.8).  
Specifically, more Caucasian, and fewer of all other ethnicities, are represented in my sample than national averages. 
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Figure 3-2 Initial Pool of Questions 
1. Tax minimization: 
 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared so I can pay the lowest tax possible.* 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because I want to save money on 
taxes.*** 
♦ My tax professional’s first priority is to see I pay as little tax as possible.*** 
♦ When dealing with unclear areas of the tax law, my tax professional’s loyalty 
should be to me, not the IRS.*** 
♦ My tax professional usually saves me tax money. 
♦ If I want to reduce my tax bill, I have to have my taxes professionally prepared. 
♦ I don’t want to pay the government one more dime than I have to. 
♦ I go to a tax professional because I want the largest refund I can get. 
♦ My tax professional always makes sure I get a refund check. 
♦ When I have my taxes professionally prepared, I get a larger refund than when 
I do it myself. 
♦ I’m willing to take a chance on being audited as long as I pay as little tax as 
possible. 
 
2. Audit Avoidance: 
 
♦ I think the IRS would be less likely to audit me if I have my taxes professionally 
prepared.** 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because I want to reduce my chances 
of being audited.*** 
♦ I expect my tax professional not to advise me to take deductions that fall into 
the grey area of the law.*** 
♦ I never want to be audited, so I have my taxes done professionally. 
♦ The best way to avoid being audited is to have a professional do your taxes. 
♦ If I do my own taxes, there is a higher chance of being audited. 
♦ People like me get audited a lot, so I have my taxes done professionally to try 
to avoid that. 
♦ All I want is to send in my taxes and never hear from the IRS at all. 
♦ I would rather pay a little more and never get audited. 
♦ It is okay to skip a deduction or two as long as that means I’ll not be audited. 
 
3. Time Savings: 
 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because it is easier than doing it 
myself.* 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because I don’t have time to do it 
myself.** 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because I am too busy to do tax 
returns.** 
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♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because I didn’t have all the forms I 
needed.** 
♦ It is a lot easier to have someone else prepare my taxes than doing it myself. 
♦ I would have to spend a lot of time finding the forms and researching things; I’d 
rather let someone else do that. 
♦ It takes so long to read the instructions and forms, it’s easier to have a tax 
professional take care of those things. 
♦ It takes so long to do tax returns; I rather let a professional handle it. 
♦ It’s okay to pay a little more as long as it doesn’t take my time. 
♦ I might pay a bit more in taxes if I have a professional tax preparer, but that’s 
okay, I save a lot of time. 
 
4. Accuracy: 
 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared so I will have the most accurate return 
possible.* 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because I am afraid I’d make a 
mistake.** 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because the forms are too 
complicated.** 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared because an accurate return is most 
important to me.*** 
♦ All aspects of my tax return should be reviewed by more than one person.*** 
♦ I depend on my tax professional to be ethical in preparing my return.*** 
♦ The advice I receive from my tax professional should be conservative.*** 
♦ It is important to me that I pay exactly what I should, so I hire someone to make 
sure. 
♦ I don’t want to pay too much or too little on my taxes. 
♦ It is okay to pay a little more in taxes to make sure I haven’t broken any laws. 
 
 
5. Money Savings: 
 
♦ Because I hoped the tax preparer could save me some money.** 
♦ Even though I pay a fee, I come out ahead financially with a tax professional. 
♦ In the long run, hiring a tax professional will save money overall. 
♦ The amount of money I save on my taxes is more than the fee I pay my tax 
professional. 
♦ My tax professional saves me money. 
♦ My tax professional takes deductions I’ve never heard of and saves me a lot of 
money. 
♦ It’s worth paying a fee to have someone do my taxes that knows the ins and outs 
of the tax law and can save me money. 
♦ The refund I get each year is more than I pay a tax professional. 
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♦ I have to write a check to someone; it might as well be a tax professional and not 
the government. 
♦ Even though I pay a fee to have my taxes prepared, I get my refund faster and it 
saves money overall. 
 
6. Insurance (against penalties and prosecution): 
 
♦ If I rely on the opinion of a tax professional, and the IRS questions it, I won’t be 
the one to get in trouble. 
♦ I can use my tax professional’s opinion to guard against penalties. 
♦ The IRS won’t prosecute me if my tax professional is wrong about something. 
♦ I know I won’t have to pay penalties if I have my taxes professionally prepared. 
♦ I know I won’t have to worry about being prosecuted for making a mistake if I 
have my taxes professionally prepared 
♦ I am more worried about being protected from penalties and/or prosecution than 
about saving money. 
♦ I am more worried about being protected from penalties and/or prosecution than 
about reducing my tax bill. 
♦ I am more worried about being protected from penalties and/or prosecution than 
about saving time. 
♦ I let my tax professional worry about all the legal stuff. 
 
 
7. Representation (in case of audit): 
 
♦ I have my taxes professionally prepared so I would have someone to come with 
me to an audit.** 
♦ If I get audited, I want to know someone will be there to go for me. 
♦ I don’t want to talk to the IRS; if they send me a letter or call me, I just have them 
talk to my tax professional. 
♦ Being audited is stressful; I’d rather let my tax professional worry about all that. 
♦ I feel reassured knowing that someone can answer any questions the IRS might 
have about my return. 
♦ It is more important to me that someone be able to represent me in case of audit 
than it is to save money. 
♦ I’d rather pay a little more and have someone that can go to an audit for me. 
♦ It’s okay to take a questionable deduction because my tax professional will 
answer to the IRS for me. 
♦ I expect my tax professional to be aggressive on my tax return, but be willing to 
defend those positions to the IRS for me. 
♦ I hire a tax professional so that I know I’ll never have to face the IRS.  
 
* Paraphrased from Collins, Milliron and Toy 1990 
** Paraphrased from Yankelovich, Skelly and White 1984 
*** Paraphrased from Christensen 1992 
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Figure 3-3 Round One Scale Development Instrument 
 
  I have my taxes professionally prepared …
 
 because I am too busy to do tax returns.   
 because I am afraid I’d make a mistake.   
 because an accurate return is very important to me.  
 because I am afraid I’d make a mistake.  
 because I don’t have time to do it myself.  
 because an accurate return is very important to me.  
 
because the forms are too complicated and I wouldn’t complete them 
correctly.   
 because I want to reduce my chances of being audited.  
 because I want to save money on taxes.  
 because I didn’t have time to get all the forms I needed.  
 
so I will have the most accurate return possible.  
so I would have my tax professional to represent me during an audit.  
because I hope the tax preparer can save me some money. 
because I want the largest refund I can get.  
so I can pay the lowest tax amount allowed under the current law.     
 
  I would rather...
 
 pay more in taxes and never get audited.   
 be protected from penalties than save money on my taxes.   
 pay a little more in taxes and make sure I haven’t broken any laws.   
 take a chance on being audited and pay less tax.   
 pay a tax preparer so I don't ever have to go to an audit.   
 pay more to a tax preparer and never get audited.   
 
pay more money and know I have someone to represent me to the IRS in 
case of audit.   
 be protected from penalties than save money on tax preparation charges.  
 be protected from penalties than save time preparing my taxes.   
 pay a tax preparer and spend less time on my taxes.   
 write a check to a tax preparer than to the government.   
 
♦ If I want to reduce my tax bill, I have to have my taxes professionally prepared. 
♦ If I prepare my own taxes, I would have to spend a lot of time finding the right tax 
forms and researching things. 
♦ If I do my own taxes, there is a higher chance of being audited. 
♦ If the IRS sends me a letter or calls me, I just have them talk to my tax professional. 
♦ If I get audited, I want to know someone will be there to go for me. 
♦ I expect my tax professional to be willing to defend his or her positions to the IRS for 
me. 
♦ I don’t want to pay too much or too little on my taxes.  
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♦ When my tax preparer signs my return, that means that I’m not responsible for 
mistakes on it. 
♦ I feel reassured knowing that my tax professional can answer any questions the IRS 
might have about my return. 
♦ It takes so long to do tax returns; I would rather let a professional handle it. 
♦ The refund I get each year is more than I pay a tax professional.   
♦ Even though I pay a fee, I come out ahead financially with a tax professional.   
♦ My tax return better not be wrong if I pay a professional to prepare it.   
♦ My tax professional’s first priority is to help me pay as little tax as possible.   
♦ The IRS won’t prosecute me personally if my tax professional is wrong about 
something.   
♦ All aspects of my tax return should be reviewed by more than one person.   
♦ The advice I receive from my tax professional should be conservative.   
♦ I never want to be audited, so I have my taxes done professionally.   
♦ My tax professional’s opinion guards me against penalties issued by the IRS.   
♦ I expect my tax professional to advise me not to take deductions that fall into 
ambiguous areas of the law.   
 
♦ Even though I pay a fee to have my taxes prepared, the fee saves me money overall.  
♦ My tax professional saves me money.   
♦ My tax professional always makes sure I get a refund check.   
♦ People in my financial situation get audited a lot, so to reduce my chance of audit I 
have my taxes done professionally.   
♦ It’s okay to take a questionable deduction because my tax professional will answer to 
the IRS for me.   
♦ It’s worth paying someone to do my taxes because they know the details of the tax law 
and can save me money.   
♦ I don’t want to pay the government one more dime than I have to.   
♦ My tax professional usually reduces my tax bill.   
♦ I just want to send in my taxes and never hear from the IRS.   
♦ I know I won’t have to pay penalties if I have my taxes professionally prepared.   
♦ My tax professional takes deductions I’ve never heard of in order to save me money.  
♦ It takes so long to read the instructions and tax forms; it’s easier to have a tax 
professional take care of those things.  
♦ Being audited is stressful; I’d rather let my tax professional worry about all that.   
♦ It is okay to skip a tax deduction or two as long as that means I’ll not be audited.   
♦ I depend on my tax professional to follow the laws in preparing my return.   
♦ The best way to avoid being audited is to have a tax professional do your taxes.   
♦ It’s okay to pay a little more to have a professional prepare my taxes as long as it 
doesn’t take my time.   
♦ When dealing with unclear areas of the tax law, my tax person's loyalty should be to 
reducing my tax bill, not to the IRS.   
♦  If I paid enough to have my taxes prepared, I could end up without any tax liability.   
 
©Teresa Stephenson 2006 31
 
 I have my taxes professionally prepared...
 
 so that if the IRS questions it, I won't be the one who gets in trouble.   
 so that I know I’ll never have to face the IRS.   
 so my tax person can worry about all the legal stuff.   
 
because the tax laws are so complex that they are beyond a layman’s 
comprehension.   
 because it is a lot easier than doing it myself.   
 because I think the IRS is less likely to audit me if I do.   
 because the amount of money I save on my taxes is more than the preparation fee.   
 because it saves me money overall.   
 because my tax person has expertise in the area.   
 because it is important to me that I pay exactly what I am supposed to in taxes.   
 so I won’t have to worry about being prosecuted for making a mistake.   
 because I get a larger refund than when I do it myself.   
 and although it costs me money, it saves me valuable time.    
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Figure 3-4 Round Two Scale Development Instrument 
♦ Time Savings 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared and although it costs me money, it saves me valuable 
time. 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared because I am too busy to do tax returns. 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared because I don't have time to do it myself. 
o If I prepare my own taxes, I would have to spend a lot of time finding the right tax forms and 
researching things. 
o It takes so long to do tax returns; I would rather let a professional handle it. 
o It takes so long to read the instructions and tax forms; it's easier to have a tax professional 
take care of those things. 
o It's okay to pay a little more to have a professional prepare my taxes as long as it doesn't take 
my time. 
o I would rather pay a tax preparer and spend less time on my taxes. 
♦ IRS Avoidance/Insurance 
o If I paid enough to have my taxes prepared, I could end up without any tax liability. 
o It is okay to skip a tax deduction or two as long as that means I'll not be audited. 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared so that I know I'll never have to face the IRS. 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared so that if the IRS questions it, I won't be the one who 
gets in trouble. 
o The IRS won't prosecute me personally if my tax professional is wrong about something. 
o When my tax preparer signs my return, that means that I'm not responsible for mistakes on it. 
♦ Accuracy/Compliance with law 
o I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on my taxes. 
o I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on tax preparation charges. 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared because it is important to me that I pay exactly what I 
am supposed to in taxes. 
o I don't want to pay too much or too little on my taxes. 
o I expect my tax professional to advise me not to take deductions that fall into ambiguous areas 
of the law. 
o I would rather pay a little more in taxes and make sure I haven't broken any laws. 
o The advice I receive from my tax professional should be conservative. 
♦ Money Savings 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared because it saves me money overall. 
o Even though I pay a fee, I come out ahead financially with a tax professional. 
o My tax professional saves me money. 
o My tax professional usually reduces my tax bill. 
o I have my taxes professionally prepared so I can pay the lowest tax amount allowed under the 
current law. 
o The refund I get each year is more than I pay a tax professional. 
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Figure 3-5 Final Tax Client Motivation Scale 
Accuracy 
I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on tax preparation charges. 
I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on my taxes. 
I would rather pay a little more in taxes and make sure I haven't broken any laws. 
Money Savings 
I have my taxes professionally prepared because it saves me money overall. 
Even though I pay a fee, I come out ahead financially with a tax professional. 
My tax professional saves me money. 
IRS Avoidance/Protection 
I have my taxes professionally prepared so that I know I'll never have to face the IRS. 
If I paid enough to have my taxes prepared, I could end up without any tax liability. 
The IRS won't prosecute me personally if my tax professional is wrong about something. 
I have my taxes professionally prepared so that if the IRS questions it, I won't be the one who gets in trouble. 
Time Savings 
I have my taxes professionally prepared because I don't have time to do it myself. 
It takes so long to do tax returns; I would rather let a professional handle it. 
It's okay to pay a little more to have a professional prepare my taxes as long as it doesn't take my time. 
I have my taxes professionally prepared and although it costs me money, it saves me valuable time. 
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Chapter 4 Method and Results 
4.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to explore the extent of the expectation gap between 
tax clients and tax professionals. An expectation gap is the difference between clients’ 
expectations about a service and the service providers’ perception of those expectations 
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985; Christensen 1992; Hite and Hasseldine 2003).  
The marketing literature suggests a method for investigating this gap, which in turn has been 
suggested as an appropriate method to examine the expectation gap in tax accounting 
(Myers and Morris 1999).  SERVQUAL,40 a method used to measure expectation gap in 
marketing, uses a survey to ask one group about its expectations and to ask the other group 
about its perception of those expectations and then compares the two (Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml, and Berry 1985, 1988; Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman 1993; Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml, and Berry 1994, 1994; Zeithaml and Bitner 2003).  A similar method has been used 
in accounting research to examine the expectation gap between auditors and investors 
(McEnroe and Martens 2001).  This is the method that I have chosen to examine the 
expectation gap between taxpayers and tax preparers in this dissertation. 
 This dissertation extends the research on the tax-preparation expectation gap in 
several ways. First, the instrument has more demographics regarding tax professionals’ 
company, experience, and qualifications than previous research. Second, direct matches are 
made between some tax professionals from various size firms and their clients. Finally, the 
instrument uses two scales -- Mason and Levy’s Taxpayer Advocacy Scale (Mason and Levy 
2001) and my Taxpayer Motivation Scale -- that were developed and tested using 
established methods. 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
An expectation gap between client expectations and what tax preparers believe those 
expectations to be has been found to exist in the top accounting firms (Christensen 1992).  
The first hypothesis in this dissertation is to confirm the existence of such a gap among the 
tax preparers not working for the Big Four accounting firms. The two scales that were used in 
this dissertation measure five separate constructs: client advocacy (CA); client motivation to 
save money (SM); to save time (ST); to acquire an accurate return or comply with the law 
(AR); and to be protected from or avoid the IRS (IRS). Each of these constructs is calculated 
by taking an average of the items that make up the construct. A significant difference in the 
means of these constructs between tax preparers and taxpayers would indicate an 
expectation gap in that dimension. Thus, the first hypothesis, stated in null form is: 
 
  H1a: CA is equal between tax preparers and taxpayers. 
  H1b: SM is equal between tax preparers and taxpayers. 
  H1c: ST is equal between tax preparers and taxpayers. 
  H1d: AR is equal between tax preparers and taxpayers. 
  H1e: IRS is equal between tax preparers and taxpayers.  
                                                 
40 LIBQUAL is a variation of SERVQUAL used by libraries around the world to measure the expectation gap that exists in 
library services. 
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This first hypothesis is tested in two different ways. First, all the tax preparer data are 
measured and compared against all the taxpayer data. Second, the individual tax preparers 
are compared to their specific clients.     
 Research has shown that CPAs are more tax aggressive than non-CPAs (Ayres, 
Jackson, and Hite 1989; Erard 1993; Cuccia 1995).  This leads to the next hypothesis: the 
client advocacy score for CPAs should be higher than for other types of tax preparers. 
 
  H2: CPAs’ CA > Non-CPAs’ CA 
 
 Jackson, Milliron & Toy (1988) suggest that volume tax preparers attract a clientele 
who desire a “safe” return whereas CPA firms attract more aggressive clients.  Looking only 
at the taxpayer data, the clients of CPA firms should believe their tax preparers exhibit a 
greater degree of advocacy while the clients of national tax preparation (NTP) firms should 
show a higher desire for an accurate return. 
 
  H3: CPA clients’ CA > Non-CPA clients’ CA 
  H4: NTP clients’ AR > Non-NTP clients’ AR 
  
 General economic theory indicates that taxpayers who have the most to gain from 
“saving time” should also have specific characteristics. Higher income means higher 
opportunity cost to time. Children at home would also indicate time is valuable, especially if 
the parent is single. A more complex return would indicate more time necessary for tax return 
preparation and, therefore, may also indicate time savings would be desired. 
 
  H5a: There is a positive correlation between taxpayer  income 
   and ST. 
  H5b: ST where there are no dependent children < ST  where 
   there are dependent children < ST where there are 
   dependent children and a single parent. 
  H5c: There is a correlation between return complexity and ST. 
  
 Experience with the IRS may create an aversion to it. Successful experience, 
however, may cause taxpayers to become more aggressive with tax reporting – this would be 
similar to the CPAs that become more tax aggressive with more experience with the IRS 
(Duncan, LaRue, and Reckers 1989). Thus, a non-directional hypothesis is given for the final 
construct. 
 
  H6: IRS is not equal between taxpayers with IRS contact and 
   those without. 
4.3 Data Collection 
The tax professionals surveyed are those from the University of Kentucky Income Tax School 
mailing list that I obtained from the School of Agricultural Economics. The survey was 
originally posted online and the email addresses from the list were used to solicit responses. 
However, many of the addresses were illegible or out of date, resulting in only 432 good 
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emails. This led to 57 completed surveys, which is a response rate of 13.2 percent. As this 
was an insufficient number of responses, the rest of the tax preparers on the mailing list were 
contacted via the U.S. Postal Service. Using some of the techniques for mailing surveys 
outlined in Dillman (1978), an additional 2,466 tax preparers were contacted.  The techniques 
used included hand-addressing the envelopes and using actual stamps instead of metered 
postage.  Table 4-1 shows the details of the response rate. Five-hundred forty-five tax 
preparers responded which was an overall 18.9 percent response rate. This is a good 
response rate for surveys that have no follow up mailing41 (Dillman 1978). 
 The survey sent to the tax professionals consisted of Mason and Levy’s Advocacy 
Scale, my Tax Client Motivation Scale, demographic questions about the preparer’s practice 
and experience, and a request to survey the preparer’s clients. The entire survey is shown in 
Figure 4.1 Previous research has surveyed tax preparers employed by the Big Four 
accounting firms. This paper extends prior research by having participant tax preparers from 
a variety of smaller firms.   
 The demographics of the tax preparers who responded to the survey are shown in 
Table 4-2. Just over half the sample are CPAs, but 20 percent have no degree or certification 
at all. The sample is heavily weighted towards those with a lot of experience; this is probably 
due to the mailing list that was acquired. The amount of time spent dealing with tax matters is 
roughly evenly distributed among the participants. About half the participants prepare or sign 
between 100 and 500 returns per year. About a third of the participants are from small, local 
CPA firms and another third are from small, local tax preparation services, including those 
who are self-employed and working from home.   
 The final request made of the tax preparers surveyed was to allow me to survey their 
clients. A total of 21 (3.8 percent) allowed me to do so.42 The demographics of this sample 
are shown in Table 4-3.  These demographics are compared to the full sample of 545 tax 
preparers that responded (Full Sample Percent).  As these demographics are all measured 
with categorical variables, a Chi-Square test was run using the full sample as the expected 
proportion.  In most cases, the smaller sample of tax preparers that allowed me to survey 
their clients is not statistically different that the larger population.  In two cases, however, this 
is not the case.  There is a higher percentage of preparers in the smaller sample that have 
four year degrees (Chi-Sq=3.231) and that are EAs (Chi-Sq=12.704) than in the full sample 
population. 
 Each of the tax preparers who permitted their clients to be surveyed had a different 
number of clients ranging from eight to 1200. A sampling of those clients was done with a 
goal of 10 percent of the clients or a minimum of 100 and maximum of 250. For those 
preparers who had less than 100 clients, a survey was sent to 100 percent of their clients. 
The response rate for each preparer varied as well, ranging from 100 percent to 17.7 
percent. The overall response rate was 30.9 percent which is an excellent response rate for a 
survey sent without a follow-up (Dillman 1978).  I attribute the excellent response rate to two 
factors. First, the surveys were sent in the envelopes of the tax preparer when possible and 
using that person’s return address label when not. This makes it more likely that the person 
receiving the survey will open it because it is from a person who they know and whose 
                                                 
41 A follow-up mailing, which was a recommended technique to increase response rates, was not done due to the expense. 
42 Twenty-one preparers allowed me to survey their clients. In one case, there are three preparers who do not distinguish 
between their clients, thus their average is used to compare the clients. In another case, there was a husband/wife team 
whose clients were separate and thus are treated separately. 
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services they use. Second, several of the tax practitioners said they would let their clients 
know that the survey was coming. This was informal and no record of it was kept, but at least 
for the tax preparers with small client bases it would explain the large response rate.43    
 It was important in surveying the taxpayers to maintain confidentiality of client lists. 
Consequently, the method I proposed to each tax preparer was that they send me enough 
company envelopes for the mailing. I would photocopy the survey and stuff the envelopes 
including a self-addressed stamped envelope in which the taxpayer could return the survey 
directly to me. I would seal the envelopes, affix postage and send the envelopes back to the 
tax preparer who would affix address labels from a random sample of clients, then drop them 
in the mail. In several cases, the tax preparer sent me the labels and I mailed the surveys 
directly. In five of the samples, 100 percent of the clients were surveyed. However, in the 
remaining samples I have no way to ensure that the surveys were sent to a random sample 
of clients.   
 The sampling and response rates are summarized in Table 4-4. In addition, there was 
one tax preparer for whom surveys were prepared and sent to her for mailing, but for whom I 
received no responses;44 this is not on the table. Finally, there was a manipulation check 
question on each survey to be sure that the taxpayer was the client of the tax preparer who 
sent the survey to them. Fourteen taxpayers answered that question “no” and are included 
on the table with no corresponding preparer data. In some cases, the data from those 
responses may be used to test hypotheses. Including these 14 records results in data from 
526 taxpayers.   
 The survey sent to the taxpayers is very similar to the one sent to tax preparers, but 
the questions are asked from the opposite perspective. The entire survey is recreated in 
Figure 4.2. The taxpayers were asked questions about demographics as well; these are 
summarized in Table 4-5. The demographics of those that answered the survey were 
compared to national statistics.45 My sample tends towards higher income, taxpayers filing 
“Married Filing Joint” status, Caucasian, 45 to 64 year olds, and college educated 
participants.  Because my sample was only of taxpayers that use tax preparers, these 
demographics are not surprising.  Prior research shows paid preparer use increases with 
income, age, self-employment, return complexity, number of dependents claimed, and 
marginal tax rate and decreases with education and tax knowledge (Slemrod and Sorum 
1984; Long and Caudill 1987; Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin 1991; Christian, Gupta, and Lin 
1993; Arena, O'Hare, and Stavrianos 2002).  As in the scale development, I encouraged the 
completion of the entire survey by allowing those who did so to vote for a charity to which I 
would send money.46
4.4 Data Analysis 
The first set of hypotheses speaks to the differences between tax preparers and taxpayers in 
general; therefore, all the records are used to evaluate these hypotheses. There are five 
constructs: saving money (SM), saving time (ST), complying with the law by filing an 
                                                 
43 I know in the one survey that had a response rate of 100 percent, the tax preparer called each client and requested that 
they complete the survey. 
44 No responses were received and follow up emails and phone calls were ignored. 
45 Statistics of Income and U.S. Census Bureau data were used for national demographic figures. 
46 American Red Cross received the most votes and was sent $100. Cancer Research Institute and the Humane Society of 
the United States were the second and third most popular charities and were sent $50 each. 
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accurate return (AR), avoiding or being protected from the IRS (IRS) and client advocacy 
(CA).  Each of these constructs is measured by taking the average score on each item of 
which the construct consists.  Each constructs is made up of three to nine items found on the 
two scales used in the instruments. The summary statistics, including a correlation table is in 
Table 4-6. Panel 1 is for all participants, taxpayer and tax preparer.  Panel 2 is for taxpayers 
only, and Panel 3 is for tax preparers only. 
 A two-sample t-test is run on each of the scores of interest. The t-test supports the 
hypothesis that taxpayers and tax preparers answered each of the five constructs differently. 
Each mean score shows a significant difference between the two groups. The results of this 
test are shown in Table 4-7.  Not every question was answered by every taxpayer or tax 
preparer, therefore each hypothesis has different numbers of participants. The first construct 
(SM) has 519 tax preparers with a mean score of 2.21 (SD=0.781) and 523 taxpayers with a 
mean score of 2.06 (SD=0.911).  The difference between the two is 0.15 which is significant 
(p=.006).  This shows that taxpayers valued saving money more than tax preparers thought 
they would.  The second one,  (ST) has 519 tax preparers with a mean score of 2.42 
(SD=0.896) and 524 taxpayers with a mean score of 2.54 (SD=1.074).  The difference 
between the two is -0.12 which is significant (p=.048). In this case, the tax preparers thought 
taxpayers would value saving time more than they actually do.  Next, (AR) has 519 tax 
preparers with a mean score of 3.16 (SD=1.065) and 524 taxpayers with a mean score of 
2.46 (SD=1.295).  The difference between the two is 0.70 which is significant (p=.000). 
Again, taxpayers value having an accurate return more than tax preparers thought they 
would.  This is the construct with the largest difference which is most likely due to taxpayers 
having an incorrect perception that there is a “correct answer” when filing a tax return. The 
fourth, (IRS) has 519 tax preparers with a mean score of 4.63 (SD=1.198) and 523 taxpayers 
with a mean score of 4.46 (SD=1.469).  The difference between the two is 0.17 which is 
significant (p=.043).  This is also more important to the taxpayer than the tax preparers 
predicted; however, this also has the greatest variance of any of the constructs for both 
taxpayers and tax preparers. It is also the only one that was on the “disagree” side of the 
scale, making it relatively less important than any of the other three motivations for hiring a 
tax preparer.  Finally, (CA) has 544 tax preparers with a mean score of 2.79 (SD=0.780) and 
479 taxpayers with a mean score of 3.12 (SD=0.900).  The difference between the two is -
0.33 which is significant (p=.000).  This shows that tax preparers tend to exhibit more client 
advocacy, or tax aggression, than taxpayers believe they do.   
 It is important to note, that although all of these differences are statistically significant, 
from a practical perspective they are small differences.  In no case is taxpayers’ average 
score on the opposite side of neutral from tax preparers’ average score.  In fact, in no case 
were the two separated by even a full point.  Each of the five constructs’ average scores for 
both groups leaned towards “agree” showing that each of the five constructs is considered 
important by both groups. It is the varying, small degrees of importance that this dissertation 
examines. 
 The most important motivation, from the taxpayer perspective, is saving money.  
Having an accurate return comes in second followed closely by saving time.  This, along with 
the fact that the largest difference is in AR and the second largest is in CA, supports prior 
research findings that taxpayers want accurate returns and that tax preparers are more 
aggressive than necessary.  My interpretation of this is that it is the major explanation of the 
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expectation gap.  Tax preparers simply are unaware, in general, of the degree of their clients’ 
desire for an accurate return and thus are more tax aggressive than their clients expect.   
 Testing each of the constructs again with the 19 sets of matched data shows similar 
results. Noreen (1989) suggests that different cell sizes, variances, and even lack of 
independence between the two samples do not matter when using “computer intensive 
methods.”  He describes a method in which you take all cells from both samples and 
randomize those 1,000 times to create a distribution.   
 Each of 19 sets of taxpayer data are matched with their tax preparer data and the 
difference is taken.  Then the absolute value of those differences is summed.  Absolute 
values are used because sometimes the tax practitioners scores are above and sometimes 
below the taxpayers; therefore, the sum of those differences would lead to an artificially small 
number.  Using the absolute differences instead shows the magnitude of the differences, 
regardless of sign.  This sum is the “actual absolute difference score.”  Imagine, though, that 
each of these groups of taxpayers chose their tax preparer at random.  I simulate this by 
randomly matching a taxpayer score and a tax preparer score.  By doing this 19 times 
without replacement, and then taking the sum of the absolute differences, I create a score 
that could have happened if taxpayers chose their tax preparers at random.  By repeating 
this 1,000 times, a distribution is created of the absolute difference scores that could be 
created by random pairing.  
 This distribution, along with summary statistics, is reported in Table 4-8 for each of the 
five constructs: ST, SM, AR, IRS, and CA.  Additionally, the actual absolute difference score 
falls is shown where it falls on that distribution.  If taxpayers choose their tax preparers to 
match their preferences on ST, SM, AR, IRS, and/or CA, then it would be expected that the 
actual absolute difference score would be small enough that it would be unlikely to happen 
by chance.  If there was a statistically significant chance that this were the case, then the 
actual absolute difference score would be among the smallest five percent of the score, 
creating a likelihood that it happened by means other than random selection with 95 percent 
probability (p-value < .05).  In no case, were the actual results small enough that it can be 
concluded they were anything but chance.  
 The summary statistics for the 1,000 SM scores created is in Panel 1.  They ranged 
from 6.12 to 13.15 with a mean (standard deviation) of 10.50 (1.23).  In Panel 2, the actual 
frequency distribution of these created SM scores is given.  The actual score calculated by 
taking the sum of the absolute differences between the 19 taxpayer-tax preparer sets is 9.63.  
The likelihood of getting this number or less from a random matching is 22.5 percent.   
 In Panel 3, the summary statistics for the random differences created from the ST 
scores is shown.  The data range from 4.89 to 13.50 with a mean (standard deviation) of 
10.23 (1.27).  In Panel 4, the frequency distribution is given.  The actual sum is 11.12 and the 
probably of drawing this number or less  randomly is 73.0 percent.  Panel 5 shows the 
summary statistics for AR.  The data range from 8.59 to 22.54 with a mean (standard 
deviation) of 16.63 (2.14).  Panel 6 shows the frequency distribution.  The likelihood of 
drawing the actual sum, 16.70, or less randomly is 50.6 percent.  Panel 7 shows the 
summary statistics for IRS.  The data range from 11.31 to 25.01 with a mean (standard 
deviation) of 19.20 (2.27).  Panel 8 shows the frequency distribution and that the likelihood of 
drawing the actual number, 19.84, or lower randomly is 60.1 percent.  Finally, Panel 9 shows 
the summary statistics for CA which range from 7.02 to 18.43 with a mean (standard 
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deviation) of 13.70 (1.80).  Panel 10 shows the accompanying frequency distribution.  The 
likelihood of drawing 15.97 or lower by chance is 91.4 percent. 
 These results show strong support for the first set of hypotheses. There is an 
expectation gap between tax preparers at levels below the Big 4 accounting firms and 
taxpayers in general. That expectation gap does not seem to go away when examining 
taxpayers’ actual choice of tax preparer. For that matter, it appears random selection would 
actually result in a better match between taxpayer and tax preparer a large portion of the 
time. 
 The second hypothesis suggests there is a difference between CPAs’ and non-CPAs’ 
attitudes towards client advocacy. The results of this two-sample t-test shows 252 non-CPAs 
with a mean score of 2.79 (SD=0.814) and 286 CPAs with a mean score of 2.79 (SD=0.756).  
The difference between the two is 0.00 which is not significant (p=0.92). Thus, this 
hypothesis is not supported by the data as shown in Table 4-9.  This is contrary to prior 
research that has found CPAs to be more aggressive than non-CPAs (Ayres, Jackson, and 
Hite 1989).  This discrepancy points to the possibility that CPAs from the Big Four, as have 
been the subjects of previous studies, may differ from CPAs from smaller firms.  More 
research is needed to distinguish which differences arise from type of firm as opposed to 
certification. 
 The third hypothesis predicts that the clients of CPAs have higher CA scores than 
other taxpayers. I test this in two ways. First, I test the taxpayers of tax practitioners who 
actually are CPAs against the other taxpayers. Next, I test the taxpayers who believe they 
are the clients of CPAs against other taxpayers. It is interesting to note that a large number of 
taxpayers believe they are having their taxes prepared by CPAs when in reality they are not. 
In my data, 180 participants believe they are the clients of CPAs when in reality they are not; 
this exceeds the actual number of CPA clients in the sample, which is 148.47 It is unknown 
whether these taxpayers have been misled by their tax preparers; however, the problem of 
misrepresenting oneself as a CPA is widespread enough that a law was passed in Michigan 
on December 19, 2005 which enhances enforcement of penalties against persons 
misrepresenting themselves as CPAs.48 The results of the CPA clients’ versus the non-CPAs 
clients’ CA scores are summarized in Table 4-10.  There were 148 actual clients of CPAs 
whose mean CA score is 3.06 (SD=0.866) and the remaining 319 taxpayers had a mean CA 
score of 3.15 (SD=0.920).  The difference between these two scores is 0.09, which is not 
significant (p=0.31).  There were 308 taxpayers that believe they are the clients of CPAs.  
They have a mean score of 3.11 (SD=0.914).  The remaining 114 taxpayers that do not 
believe themselves to be the clients of CPAs had a mean score of 3.18 (SD=.909).  The 
difference between the two scores is 0.07 and not significant (p=0.47). Thus, this hypothesis 
is not supported.   
 The fourth hypothesis states that the clients of NTP firms have higher AR scores than 
other taxpayers. This was tested in a similar fashion to the previous hypothesis in that first 
the actual matched data from the one NTP firm preparer who allowed me to survey clients 
was used. After that, a comparison of all the taxpayers who believe they are going to a NTP 
firm against those who do not. As I know the type of company for all taxpayers, the first test 
used more records. Many taxpayers did not answer this question and for the second test, I 
                                                 
47 Only 7 CPA clients answered that their practitioner was not a CPA, although quite a few participants left the question 
blank. 
48 Michigan State Senate Bill 0723 (2005) Public Act 278 of 2005. 
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only used those who did. In addition, several of the clients of the NTP firm did not believe 
they were using one. Table 4-11 shows the results from comparing the clients of NTP firms to 
other taxpayers. Twenty-three NTP clients had a mean AR score of 2.04 (SD=1.031) 
compared to 487 non-NTP clients with a mean score of 2.47 (SD=1.308).  The different 
between these is -0.43 which is marginally significant (p-value=.066).  Six clients who use a 
NTP did not know that they did so; this is approximately 26 percent of the clients of the 
NTPs. On the other hand, 17 taxpayers who believe they use a NTP had a mean AR score of 
2.14 (SD=.993) are compared to 460 who believe that they do not use a NTP with a mean 
score of 2.49( SD=1.32).  The difference in this case is only -0.35 which is not significant (p-
value=.174). Therefore, there is only weak, partial support for this hypothesis.  
 The next hypothesis examines how income, dependent children and return complexity 
affect the motivation to save time (ST). The results are shown in Table 4-12. Panel 1 takes 
the five categorical income variables as the independent variable in one-way ANOVA and 
shows that income has no significant effect (p=0.507) on the motivation to save time.49   
 Panel 2 compares taxpayers with no dependent children to taxpayers with dependent 
children using a two-sample t-test.  There were 230 taxpayers with one or more children in 
their household.  These taxpayers had a mean score of 2.39 (SD=1.031).  The remaining 
263 taxpayers without dependent children had a mean score of 2.64 (SD=1.082).  The 
difference between the two groups is -0.25 which is significant (p=.008).  This shows that 
time is more important to taxpayers with dependent children than taxpayers without 
dependent children and supports the first half of Hypothesis 5b.   
 Panel 3 compares single and married taxpayers, both with dependent children. Single 
taxpayers were identified as those who claimed they filed single, head of household or 
qualifying widow(er). Married taxpayers were identified as those who claimed married filing 
joint. I left married filing separately out of the calculation, as there is no way to know why a 
taxpayer would choose this method; it may be because they have been separated for more 
than a year (single) or that they do not want to file a joint return for some other reason 
(married). Additionally, those taxpayers who have children, but did not list under which 
method they file are not included. In both panels, the dependent variable is ST. For single 
taxpayers with children, the mean score is 2.52 (N=137; SD=1.128) and for those that are 
married the mean score is 2.54 (N=344; SD=1.043).  The difference between the two is -0.02 
which is not significant (p-0.858).  Thus the second half of Hypothesis 5b is not supported.  I 
conclude that time is a significantly more important motivator to taxpayers who have children 
than to those who do not. However, marital status does not make a significant impact on the 
motivation to save time for taxpayers with children.  
 Panel 4 shows that return complexity has no significant effect on taxpayers’ motivation 
to save time. A common proxy for return complexity in previous research is the total number 
of income or deductions classifications the participant has claimed (Collins, Milliron, and Toy 
1990).  Using the number of items checked as an income or deduction item as a categorical 
variable for return complexity, a one-way ANOVA was run with return complexity as the 
independent variable and ST as the dependent variable.  The results were not significant 
(p=.257). Therefore, the only part of the fifth hypothesis that was supported by the data was 
                                                 
49 Treating income as a continuous variable as opposed to a categorical variable did not change these results. 
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that taxpayers with children have a stronger motivation to save time by hiring a tax preparer 
than taxpayers without children.50  
 Panel 5 shows regression results run with ST as the dependent variable and children, 
income and complexity as the independent variables.  The results were similar.  Income and 
complexity were not significant variables in the equation; however, when including them the 
effect children has on the return is less than in the ANOVA. 
 The final hypothesis suggests that people who have had IRS contact will differ from 
those who have not in their desire to avoid the IRS. The results for this hypothesis are shown 
in Table 4-13. This was tested with a two-sample t-test. First, all taxpayers who responded to 
this question were divided into two groups.  There were 328 participants that had not had any 
kind of contact with the IRS; their mean score was 4.36 (SD=1.443). The remaining 160 
participants that have not had contact with the IRS had a mean score of 4.65 (SD=1.404).  
The difference between the two groups is -0.29 which is significant (p=0.031). The 
hypothesis was non-directional because IRS contact may make one more wary of the IRS 
and thus more motivated to avoid them, or it may make one more comfortable with the IRS 
and lessen that motivation. The data suggest the latter. There is no significant difference 
between taxpayers who have received a letter from the IRS and those who have not. 
However, there is a significant difference between those who have had an audit in the IRS’ 
office and those who have not. In this case, 38 participants had to visit the IRS office.  Their 
mean score was 4.91 (SD=1.403).  The 450 participants that did not have to visit an IRS 
office have a mean score of 4.42 (SD=1.433).  The difference between the two groups is -
0.49 which is significant (p=0.042). This difference is in the same direction as the overall 
difference, suggesting that after being audited at the IRS’ facilities once, taxpayers are less 
intimidated by the IRS. Interestingly, between taxpayers who have undergone a field audit 
and those who have not there is no significant difference.   
4.5 Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research 
Overall, the results of this dissertation show that there is an expectation gap between tax 
preparers at small and regional firms and taxpayers that choose to have their taxes 
professionally prepared.  This is evidenced by the strong results of the first hypothesis.  Each 
of the five constructs measured in this dissertation showed a significant difference between 
the participant taxpayers overall and participant tax preparers overall. Additionally, there is no 
evidence to suggest that tax preparer selection is based on anything non-random.  The 
difference between the taxpayers’ scores and those of the tax preparers they hire are not 
smaller than would be suggested by random pairing. 
 There is evidence to suggest that the levels of client advocacy do not differ between 
CPAs and non-CPAs as shown in prior literature. However, my participants are from regional 
or local CPA firms, local offices of NTP firms, and individual practitioners whereas prior 
research has been concentrated on the Big Four CPA firms. This may indicate that there is a 
distinction between certification and type of firm (CPAs that work for the Big Four are more 
aggressive than CPAs that work elsewhere).  It does not address whether this is because the 
Big Four attract aggressive CPAs, or if the culture at the Big Four fosters tax aggression.  
Additionally, in measuring the perception of client advocacy, there is no difference between 
the clients of CPAs and non-CPAs. This may indicate that this difference has diminished with 
                                                 
50 Additionally, a regression was run with ST as the dependent variable and children, income and return complexity as 
independent variables.  The results were similar in that only children were statistically significant to the equation. 
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time or it may be that the difference is only found at the Big Four accounting firms. More 
research will be necessary to determine which of these is more correct.   
 This research indicates that the clients of NTP firms have a stronger desire for an 
accurate return than do other taxpayers; however, this does not hold for those that believe 
they are using a NTP firm. More research on taxpayer perceptions and choice of preparer 
may clarify this data.  
 Determining what factors make saving money an issue resulted in inconclusive 
results. Taxpayers with children do find saving time to be important.  However, the data does 
not support that single-parents find saving time to be a more important motivation to hire a 
tax professional than married taxpayers with children do.  A possible explanation is that 
looking at tax filing status is not a good proxy for being a single parent.  A taxpayer could file 
a single return (or head of household or qualifying widow) while living with a partner that 
takes an active role in childcare.  Conversely, a taxpayer could file a return claiming married 
filing joint but have a spouse that is not at home, for example serving in the military overseas.  
Future research could examine this issue more explicitly. 
 Lower tax knowledge is correlated with a stronger desire for an accurate return. This 
adds veracity to the idea that those that know less about taxes and hire a tax professional 
believe there is a low variance around the “correct” tax liability.  Future research should 
examine what leads to greater tax knowledge.   
 This research finds that among taxpayers that hire a tax preparer, contact with the IRS 
reduces the desire to avoid it. This is similar to prior research that shows that CPAs with 
greater and more successful experience with the IRS are more aggressive (Duncan, LaRue, 
and Reckers 1989; Schisler 1994).  It also indicates that perhaps the perception of the IRS is 
more intimidating than the reality.  If this is so, it has implications for tax compliance.  This, 
too, is an area for future research.   
 This dissertation contributes to the accounting tax literature in a number of ways. First, 
it extends previous research on the expectation gap in tax preparation by examining tax 
professionals from many different firms, instead of Big Four tax professionals. Second, it 
partitions the data based on tax preparer attributes and investigates the difference in the gap 
for each partition. A scale was also developed as part of this dissertation that will be useful in 
future research about taxpayer motivation. 
 There are limitations in any survey-based research. There is possibly a self-selection 
bias in those who choose to respond to the survey. As part of it was conducted via the 
internet, it would tend to attract higher income and better-educated taxpayers. There was no 
incentive paid based on the way that the survey was answered, and therefore the answers 
may be a result of social desirability bias or demand bias. Additionally, by necessity, the 
sample sizes are smaller than one would like and the tax preparer survey was geographically 
limited to Kentucky-area tax professionals. However, as a step in the direction of 
understanding the taxpayer-tax preparer relationship better, it is the best method available at 
this time. 
A follow up study could investigate whether these findings apply to partnership, small 
corporation or large corporation tax preparation. In addition, it would be interesting to extend 
this research to those persons using tax software. Tax software is becoming a major 
industry, yet the use of tax professionals is also rising. Do taxpayers view tax software as an 
alternative to preparing tax returns by hand? Or as an alternative to hiring a professional? 
Both? Are these different for different demographics? Finally, combining motivation with 
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compliance research is compelling, both from the direction of the taxpayer and the tax 
professional, providing another direction of further study. 
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Table 4-1 Survey Response Rate 
 Number of Tax 
Preparers 
Respondents Response Rates 
 (in Percentages) 
Original Mailing List 3,543  
Duplicates or No Contact Information 427  
Number able to be contacted 3116  
Contacted by Email 650  
Email addresses rejected 218  
Net Email Contacts 432 57 13.2
Remainder contacted by U.S. 
Postal Service 2,684  
Surveys returned with respondent 
deceased 10  
Surveys returned with respondent 
declining to answer 6  
Surveys returned with respondent no 
longer in practice 74  
Surveys returned undeliverable 149  
Net U.S. Postal Contacts 2,445 488 20.0
Total Potential Contacts 2,877 545 18.9
This table shows the response rate for the survey sent to tax preparers.  The first wave was done via email and due to an 
unsatisfactory response rate, a second wave was sent via the U.S. Postal Service. 
©Teresa Stephenson 2006 46
Table 4-2 Tax Preparer Demographics 
Panel 1 - Qualification 
 CPAs Four-year degree 
in Accounting² 
Some 
Training – 
No Degree 
Graduate 
School 
Enrolled 
Agents 
Other³ Tax 
Attorney 
Terminal 
Degree 
Total4 
Number 286 207 112 67 55 45 10 6 5455 
Percent 52.4 37.9 20.5 12.2 10.0 8.2 1.8 1.1  
Panel 2 – Years of Experience 
 0-5 6-10 11-20 21+ Total6 
Number 21 64 128 327 540 
Percent 3.9 11.9 23.7 60.6 100.0¹ 
Panel 3 – Percentage of Time Spent in Tax Matters 
 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 Total7 
Number 81 95 137 131 94 538 
Percent 15.1 17.7 25.5 24.3 17.5 100.0¹ 
Panel 4 – Number of Returns Personally Prepared or Signed 
 1-25 26-100 101-500 500+ Total 
Number 76 99 270 90 5358 
Percent 14.2 18.5 50.5 16.8 100.0 
Panel 5 – Type of Firm 
 Law 
Practice 
Big 4 Regional 
CPA Firm  
Local CPA 
Firm – 
More than 
10 CPAs 
Local CPA 
Firm – 
Fewer than 
10 CPAs 
National 
Tax 
Preparation 
Service9 
Local Tax 
Preparation 
Service10 
Other Total 
Number 20 1 27 41 201 19 211 19 53911 
Percent 3.7 0.02 5.0 7.6 37.3 3.5 39.1 3.5 100.0¹ 
This table shows the demographics of the 545 tax preparers responded after being contacted with via email or the U.S. Postal 
Service.  This is subsequently referred to as the “full sample percent.” 
¹Does not sum to 100 due to rounding. 
² It is presumed that all CPAs have at least a four-year degree in accounting, but not all of the ones that checked CPA 
responded about education. Similarly, it would be presumed that those with graduate school or a terminal degree would also 
have a four-year degree but it was not so noted on most surveys. This may be because the question only inquired about a four-
year degree in accounting. 
³ The most common “other” designation was Certified Financial Planner, but there were many others. 
4 No total percent is given because many of the participants had more than one designation so the total exceeds 100. 
5 Does not sum to 545 because many of the participants noted more than one qualification. Additionally, six participants did 
not list their qualifications at all. 
6 Does not equal 545 because five participants did not answer this question.  
7 Does not equal 545 because seven participants did not answer this question. 
8 Does not equal 545 because ten participants did not answer this question. 
9 Such as H&R Block 
10 If a participant checked “other” and then noted that they work for themselves or are self-employed, I coded it to reflect 
“Local Tax Preparation Service.” 
11 Does not equal 545 because six participants did not answer this question. 
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Table 4-3 Demographics of Tax Preparers that Permitted a Client Survey 
Panel 1 - Qualification 
 CPAs Four-year degree 
in Accounting3 
Some 
Training – 
No Degree 
Graduate 
School 
Enrolled 
Agents4 
Other Tax 
Attorney 
Terminal 
Degree 
Total4 
Number 9 12 4 2 7 3 0 0 21 
Percent 42.9 57.1 19.0 9.5 33.3 14.3 0 0  
Full 
Sample 
Percent 
52.4 37.9 20.5 12.2 10.0 8.2 1.8 1.1  
Panel 2 – Years of Experience 
 0-5 6-10 11-20 21+ Total 
Number 0 1 4 16 21 
Percent 0 4.8 19.0 76.2 100.0 
Full 
Sample 
Percent 
3.9 11.9 23.7 60.6 100.01 
Panel 3 – Percentage of Time Spent in Tax Matters 
 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 Total 
Number 1 6 5 5 4 21 
Percent 4.8 28.6 23.8 23.8 19.0 100.0 
Full 
Sample 
Percent 
15.1 17.7 25.5 24.3 17.5    100.01 
Panel 4 – Number of Returns Personally Prepared or Signed 
 1-25 26-100 101-500 500+ Total 
Number 1 5 10 5 21 
Percent 4.8 23.8 47.6 23.8 100.0 
Full 
Sample 
Percent 
14.2 18.5 50.5 16.8 100.0 
Panel 5 – Type of Firm 
 Law 
Practice 
Big 4 Regional 
CPA Firm  
Local CPA 
Firm – 
More than 
10 CPAs 
Local CPA 
Firm – 
Fewer than 
10 CPAs 
National 
Tax 
Preparation 
Service 
Local Tax 
Preparation 
Service 
Other Total 
Number 0 0 0 1 8 1 11 0 21 
Percent 0 0 0 4.8 38.1 4.8 52.4 0 100.01 
Full 
Sample 
Percent 
3.7 0.02 5.0 7.6 37.3 3.5 39.1 3.5 100.01 
Number shows the proportion of preparers with each characteristic out of the 21 that allowed me to survey their clients.  Percent is out of the 
smaller sample of 21.  Full Sample Percent is the proportion of each characteristic from the larger sample of 545 preparers that responded to 
the survey. A comparison of these demographics to the full sample percent was performed using a Chi-Square test with the full sample 
percent as the expected frequency.  Any statistically significant differences have been footnoted. 
1 Does not sum to 100 because of rounding. 
2 No total percent is given because many of the participants had more than one designation so the total exceeds 100. 
3 There is a greater proportion of preparers with a four-year degree in the sample that allowed me to survey their clients than in the full 
sample population (Chi-Square = 3.231) 
4 There is a greater proportion of preparers that are Enrolled Agents in the sample that allowed me to survey their clients than in the full 
sample population (Chi-Square = 12.704) 
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Table 4-4 Taxpayer Sampling and Response Rates 
Approximate 
Number of Clients 
Number of 
Clients 
Surveyed 
Survey 
Percent 
Responses Response 
Rate 
Response Rate as a 
Percentage of Total 
Number of Clients 
2,600 250 9.6 53 21.2 2.0 
1,300 130 10.0 27 20.8 2.1 
1,300 130 10.0 23 17.7 1.8 
1,000 100 10.0 43 43.0 4.3 
920 100 10.9 39 39.0 4.2 
462 100 21.6 37 37.0 8.0 
350 100 28.6 34 34.0 9.7 
3001 100 33.3 44 44.0 14.7 
3002 100 33.3 36 36.0 12.0 
200 100 50.0 27 27.0 13.5 
130 100 76.9 24 24.0 18.5 
110 100 90.9 26 26.0 23.6 
100 100 100.0 34 34.0 34.0 
50 50 100.0 22 44 44.0 
35 35 100.0 8 22.9 22.9 
Unknown3 28 Unknown 16 57.1 Unknown 
28 28 100.0 11 39.3 39.3 
8 8 100.0 8 100.0 100.0 
Total: 9193 1659 18.0 512 30.9 5.6 
Twenty-one tax preparers allowed me to survey their clients.  This table shows the number of surveys sent to each sample and the 
subsequent response rates.  It is broken down into 18 groups because three CPAs share their clients and are grouped together and one 
husband and wife team’s clients were separated into two samples after the fact. 
1 This sample is from a group of CPAs who share their clients and thus could not be separated into individual samples. 
2 This sample was originally mailed for one preparer but enough responses came back with the name of the partner written in that a 
survey was completed by the partner and the sample is split into two for analysis purposes. 
3 One hundred surveys were originally prepared for this large CPA firm. They were unwilling to share the exact number of clients with 
me and when they received the survey, informed me they would only actually mail 28. 
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Table 4-5 Taxpayer Demographics 
Panel 1 – Income1 
 Less than 
$25,000 
$25,000 to 
less than 
$50,000 
$50,000 to 
less than 
$100,000 
$100,000 or 
more 
Prefer not to 
answer 
Left blank Total 
Number 36 135 189 122 18 26 526 
Percent 6.8 25.7 35.9 23.2 3.4 4.9 100.02 
National3 45.8 25.4 20.5 8.3 NA NA 100.0 
Panel 2 – Filing Status4 
 Single Married 
filing joint 
Married 
filing 
separate 
Head of 
household 
Qualifying 
widow(er) 
Prefer not to 
answer 
Left blank Total 
Number 90 346 11 24 24 3 28 526 
Percent 17.1 65.8 2.1 4.6 4.6 0.6 5.3 100.02 
National5 44.0 39.4 16.6 NA NA 100.0 
Panel 3 – Ethnicity6 
 Black/ 
African 
American 
White/ 
Caucasian 
Native 
American 
Latino/ 
Hispanic 
Asian/ 
Pacific 
Islander 
Other Prefer not 
to answer  
Left blank Total 
Number 15 463 4 3 3 2 6 30 526 
Percent 2.9 88.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 1.1 5.7 100.02 
National7 12.3 69.1 0.9 12.5 3.6 1.6 NA NA 100.0 
Panel 4 – Number of Dependent Children 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 or more Prefer not 
to answer 
Left blank Total 
Number 264 77 96 37 11 7 6 28 526 
Percent 50.2 14.6 18.3 7.0 2.1 1.3 1.1 5.3 100.02 
Panel 5 – Age8 
 Under 18 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Prefer 
not to 
answer 
Left 
blank 
Total 
Number 2 4 42 114 148 102 82 4 28 526 
Percent 0.4 0.8 8.0 21.7 28.1 19.4 15.6 0.8 5.3 100.02 
National9 35.310 14.2 16.0 13.4 8.6 12.4 NA NA 100.02 
Panel 6 – Gender11 
 Male Female Prefer not to answer Left Blank Total 
Number 233 241 12 40 526 
Percent 44.3 45.8 2.3 7.6 100.0 
National7 49.1 50.9 NA NA 100.0 
Panel 7 – Education12 
 Less than 
high 
school 
High 
school  
Some 
college 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
Master’s 
degree 
Doctorate Prefer not 
to answer 
Left blank Total 
Number 8 97 153 132 72 34 4 26 526 
Percent 1.5 18.4 29.1 25.1 13.7 6.5 0.8 4.9 100.0 
National7 19.6 28.6 27.313 15.5 8.9 NA NA 100.02 
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This table shows the demographics of the 526 taxpayers that responded to the survey. The actual demographics are given in absolute 
numbers and in percentages. They are compared to national statistics where such statistics are available.  NA means not applicable. 
1 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Statistics of Income (Chi-Square = 406.4).  
Specifically, more participants have incomes higher than $50,000 and fewer have less than that. 
2 Does not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 
3 Source: Statistics of Income Table 1. – Individual Income Tax, All Returns: Sources of Income and Adjustments, by Size of Adjusted 
Gross Income, Fiscal Year 2002. 
4 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Statistics of Income (Chi-Square = 198.5).  
Specifically, it is weighted towards taxpayers filing under the “Married Filing Joint” status. 
5 Source: IRS, Statistics of Income, Individual Complete Report 2002, Publication 1304, February 2005. 
6 This distribution is significantly different that the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 151.6).  
Specifically, more Caucasian, and fewer of all other ethnicities, are represented in my sample than national averages. 
7 Source: Census Bureau Data from Census Year 2000. 
8 Some participants checked two ages, presumably for themselves and their spouse. Those were not entered and thus will be counted as 
“left blank.”  This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 
84.77).  Specifically, my sample is weighted towards 45-64 year old taxpayers at the expense of the other age groups. 
9 Source: Census Bureau Data from Census Year 2000.  The first cell is for ages 0-24. 
10 Because the Census Bureau Data includes persons of all ages, but few children file their own returns, this category is not compared 
using Chi-Square.  A weighted average of the remaining categories is tested. 
11 Some participants checked two genders, presumably for themselves and their spouse. Those were not entered and thus will be counted 
as “left blank.”  This distribution is not different than would be expected based on Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = .001).  
12 This distribution is significantly different than the expected distribution based on the Census Bureau Data (Chi-Square = 224.2).  
Specifically, my sample includes more college educated people at all levels, and fewer people with only a high school degree or less. 
13 Includes persons with an Associate’s Degree. 
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Table 4-6 Correlation Tables and Summary Statistics 
Panel 1 – Summary Statistics and Correlation Table for All Taxpayers and Tax Preparers 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
Minimum-
Maximum 
(Median) 
SM ST AR IRS CA 
SM 1042 2.14 .852 1.0-7.0 (2.00) 1.000 .372** .216** .146** .181**
ST 1043 2.48 .991 1.0-7.0 (2.25)  1.000 .255** .310** .192**
AR 1043 2.81 1.238 1.0-7.0 (2.67)   1.000 .360** -.028 
IRS 1042 4.54 1.343 1.0-7.0 (4.75)    1.000 .162**
CA 1023 2.94 .854 1.0-6.3 (2.89)     1.000 
Panel 2 – Summary Statistics and Correlation Table for All Taxpayers 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 
Minimum-
Maximum 
(Median) 
SM ST AR IRS CA 
SM 523 2.06 .911 1.0-5.3 (2.00) 1.000 .411** .267** .198** .215**
ST 524 2.54 1.074 1.0-7.0 (2.50)  1.000 .311** .330** .220**
AR 524 2.46 1.295 1.0-7.0 (2.00)   1.000 .406** .075 
IRS 523 4.46 1.469 1.0-7.0 (4.50)    1.000 .266**
CA 479 3.12 .900 1.0-6.3 (3.11)     1.000 
Panel 3 – Summary Statistics and Correlation Table for All Tax Preparers 
 N Mean 
Minimum-
Maximum 
(Median) 
Std. Dev. SM ST AR IRS CA 
SM 519 2.21 1.0-7.0 (2.0) .781 1.000 .335** .106* .060 .184**
ST 519 2.42 1.0-7.0 (2.25) .896  1.000 .245** .292** .138**
AR 519 3.16 1.0-6.7 (3.00) 1.065   1.000 .285** -.017 
IRS 519 4.62 1.0-7.0 (4.75) 1.198    1.000 .067 
CA 544 2.79 1.0-5.9 (2.78) .780     1.000 
** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
* Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 4-7 Taxpayer v. Tax Preparer Means 
Panel 1 – Overall Means  
Construct Participant N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
SM Tax Preparer 519 2.21 0.781 .034 
 Taxpayer 523 2.06 0.911 .040 
 Difference (p-value)  0.15 (.006)   
ST Tax Preparer 519 2.42 0.896 .039 
 Taxpayer 524 2.54 1.074 .047 
 Difference (p-value)  -0.12 (.048)   
AR Tax Preparer 519 3.16 1.065 .047 
 Taxpayer 524 2.46 1.295 .057 
 Difference (p-value)  0.70 (.000)   
IRS Tax Preparer 519 4.63 1.198 .053 
 Taxpayer 523 4.46 1.469 .064 
 Difference (p-value)  0.17 (.043)   
CA Tax Preparer 544 2.79 0.780 .033 
 Taxpayer 479 3.12 0.900 .041 
 Difference (p-value)  -0.33 (.000)   
Compares the means of all taxpayers and all tax preparers on the five tested constructs: Saving Money (SM), Saving Time 
(ST), Accurate Return (AR), Avoidance of, or protection from, the IRS (IRS), and Client Advocacy (CA).  Each construct 
consists of the average scores of the scale items that make up that construct.  There were three to nine items for each. 
All differences were tested with two-sample t-test and the p-values are two-tailed with no assumption of equal variances.  All 
differences were significant (p<.05). 
All items were asked on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from a low of “strongly agree” to a high of “strongly disagree.” A 
score of 4 was a neutral midpoint labeled “neither agree nor disagree.” Therefore, a  lower score means greater importance 
for that construct. 
©Teresa Stephenson 2006 53
Table 4-8 Taxpayer v. Tax preparer Means - Matched Sets 
Panel 1 – Summary Statistics for SM Differences 
 Total Absolute Difference Average Absolute Difference 
Mean 10.50 0.55 
Median 10.67 0.56 
Standard Deviation 1.23  
Minimum 6.12 0.32 
Maximum 13.15 0.69 
These are the summary statistics for the distribution of 1,000 random pairings between taxpayers and tax preparers for the construct  SM. 
The “Total Absolute Difference” Column is for the absolute sum of the differences, and the “Average Absolute Difference” Column divides 
that score by 19 so to make it comparable to other tables in this dissertation. 
Panel 2 -  Frequency Distribution SM Differences 
Difference Score Range Count Cumulative Frequency Actual Difference (p-value) 
6.00 to 6.99 [0.32 to 0.37] 7 0.70%  
7.00 to 7.99 [0.37 to 0.42] 29 3.60%  
8.00 to 8.99 [0.42 to 0.47] 94 13.00%  
9.00 to 9.99 [0.47 to 0.53] 179 30.90% 9.63 [0.51] (.225) 
10.00 to 10.99 [0.53 to 0.58] 320 62.90%  
11.00 to 11.99 [0.58 to 0.63] 269 89.80%  
12.00 to 12.99 [0.63 to 0.68] 94 99.20%  
13.00 to 13.99 [0.68 to 0.74] 8 100.00%  
This panel displays the frequency distribution for the sum of the absolute differences between 1,000 random pairs of taxpayer and tax 
preparer for the construct SM.  The numbers in brackets have been divided by 19 to make the scores comparable to other tables in this 
dissertation. 
Panel 3 – Summary Statistics for ST Differences 
 Total Absolute Difference Average Absolute Difference 
Mean 10.23 0.54 
Median 10.34 0.54 
Standard Deviation 1.27  
Minimum 4.89 0.26 
Maximum 13.50 0.71 
These are the summary statistics for the distribution of 1,000 random pairings between taxpayers and tax preparers for the construct ST. 
The “Total Absolute Difference” Column is for the absolute sum of the differences, and the “Average Absolute Difference” Column divides 
that score by 19 so to make it comparable to other tables in this dissertation. 
Panel 4 -  Frequency Distribution ST Differences 
Difference Score Range Count Cumulative Frequency Actual Difference (p-value) 
4.00 to 4.99 [0.21 to 0.26] 1 0.10%  
5.00 to 5.99 [0.26 to 0.32] 1 0.20%  
6.00 to 6.99 [0.32 to 0.37] 8 1.00%  
7.00 to 7.99 [0.37 to 0.42] 37 4.70%  
8.00 to 8.99 [0.42 to 0.47] 128 17.50%  
9.00 to 9.99 [0.47 to 0.53] 231 40.60%  
10.00 to 10.99 [0.53 to 0.58] 298 70.40%  
11.00 to 11.99 [0.58 to 0.63] 233 93.70% 11.12 [0.59] (.730) 
12.00 to 12.99 [0.63 to 0.68] 57 99.40%  
13.00 to 13.99 [0.68 to 0.74] 6 100.00%  
This panel displays the frequency distribution for the sum of the absolute differences between 1,000 random pairs of taxpayer and tax 
preparer for the construct ST.  The numbers in brackets have been divided by 19 to make the scores comparable to other tables in this 
dissertation. 
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Panel 5 – Summary Statistics for AR Differences 
 Total Absolute Difference Average Absolute Difference 
Mean 16.63 0.88 
Median 16.68 0.88 
Standard Deviation 2.14  
Minimum 8.59 0.45 
Maximum 22.54 1.19 
These are the summary statistics for the distribution of 1,000 random pairings between taxpayers and tax preparers for the construct AR. 
The “Total Absolute Difference” Column is for the absolute sum of the differences, and the “Average Absolute Difference” Column divides 
that score by 19 so to make it comparable to other tables in this dissertation. 
Panel 6 -  Frequency Distribution AR Differences 
Difference Score Range Count Cumulative Frequency Actual Difference (p-value) 
8.00 to 8.99 [0.42 to 0.47] 1 0.10%  
9.00 to 9.99 [0.47 to 0.53] 0 0.10%  
10.00 to 10.99 [0.53 to 0.58] 2 0.30%  
11.00 to 11.99 [0.58 to 0.63] 12 1.50%  
12.00 to 12.99 [0.63 to 0.68] 28 4.30%  
13.00 to 13.99 [0.68 to 0.74] 74 11.70%  
14.00 to 14.99 [0.74 to 0.79] 123 24.00%  
15.00 to 15.99 [0.79 to 0.84] 145 38.50%  
16.00 to 16.99 [0.84 to 0.89] 168 55.30% 16.70 [0.88] (.506) 
17.00 to 17.99 [0.89 to 0.95] 169 72.20%  
18.00 to 18.99 [0.95 to 1.00] 140 86.20%  
19.00 to 19.99 [1.00 to 1.05] 86 94.80%  
20.00 to 20.99 [1.05 to 1.10] 37 98.50%  
21.00 to 21.99 [1.11 to 1.16] 12 99.70%  
22.00 to 22.99 [1.16 to 1.21] 3 100.00%  
This panel displays the frequency distribution for the sum of the absolute differences between 1,000 random pairs of taxpayer and tax 
preparer for the construct AR.  The numbers in brackets have been divided by 19 to make the scores comparable to other tables in this 
dissertation. 
Panel 7 – Summary Statistics for IRS Differences 
 Total Absolute Difference Average Absolute Difference 
Mean 19.20 1.01 
Median 19.17 1.01 
Standard Deviation 2.27  
Minimum 11.31 0.60 
Maximum 25.01 1.32 
These are the summary statistics for the distribution of 1,000 random pairings between taxpayers and tax preparers for the construct IRS. 
The “Total Absolute Difference” Column is for the absolute sum of the differences, and the “Average Absolute Difference” Column divides 
that score by 19 so to make it comparable to other tables in this dissertation. 
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Panel 8 -  Frequency Distribution IRS Differences 
Difference Score Range Count Cumulative Frequency Actual Difference (p-value) 
11.00 to 11.99 [0.58 to 0.63] 2 0.20%  
12.00 to 12.99 [0.63 to 0.68] 3 0.50%  
13.00 to 13.99 [0.68 to 0.74] 6 1.10%  
14.00 to 14.99 [0.74 to 0.79] 26 3.70%  
15.00 to 15.99 [0.79 to 0.84] 50 8.70%  
16.00 to 16.99 [0.84 to 0.89] 80 16.70%  
17.00 to 17.99 [0.89 to 0.95] 139 30.60%  
18.00 to 18.99 [0.95 to 1.00] 157 46.30%  
19.00 to 19.99 [1.00 to 1.05] 167 63.00% 19.84 [1.04] (.601) 
20.00 to 20.99 [1.05 to 1.10] 136 76.60%  
21.00 to 21.99 [1.11 to 1.16] 123 88.90%  
22.00 to 22.99 [1.16 to 1.21] 68 95.70%  
23.00 to 23.99 [1.21 to 1.26] 37 99.40%  
24.00 to 24.99 [1.26 to 1.32] 5 99.90%  
25.00 to 25.99 [1.32 to 1.37] 1 100.00%  
This panel displays the frequency distribution for the sum of the absolute differences between 1,000 random pairs of taxpayer and tax 
preparer for the construct IRS.  The numbers in brackets have been divided by 19 to make the scores comparable to other tables in this 
dissertation. 
Panel 9 – Summary Statistics for CA Differences 
 Total Absolute Difference Average Absolute Difference 
Mean 13.70 0.72 
Median 13.78 .073 
Standard Deviation 1.80  
Minimum 7.02 0.37 
Maximum 18.43 0.97 
These are the summary statistics for the distribution of 1,000 random pairings between taxpayers and tax preparers for the construct CA. 
The “Total Absolute Difference” Column is for the absolute sum of the differences, and the “Average Absolute Difference” Column divides 
that score by 19 so to make it comparable to other tables in this dissertation. 
Panel 10 -  Frequency Distribution CA Differences 
Difference Score Range Count Cumulative Frequency Actual Difference (p-value) 
7.00 to 7.99 [0.37 to 0.42] 6 0.60%  
8.00 to 8.99 [0.42 to 0.47] 3 0.90%  
9.00 to 9.99 [0.47 to 0.53] 16 2.50%  
10.00 to 10.99 [0.53 to 0.58] 46 7.10%  
11.00 to 11.99 [0.58 to 0.63] 111 18.20%  
12.00 to 12.99 [0.63 to 0.68] 150 33.20%  
13.00 to 13.99 [0.68 to 0.74] 211 54.30%  
14.00 to 14.99 [0.74 to 0.79] 221 76.40%  
15.00 to 15.99 [0.79 to 0.84] 151 91.50% 15.97 [0.84] (0.914) 
16.00 to 16.99 [0.84 to 0.89] 61 97.60%  
17.00 to 17.99 [0.89 to 0.95] 23 99.90%  
18.00 to 18.99 [0.95 to 1.00] 1 100.00%  
This panel displays the frequency distribution for the sum of the absolute differences between 1,000 random pairs of taxpayer and tax 
preparer for the construct CA.  The numbers in brackets have been divided by 19 to make the scores comparable to other tables in this 
dissertation. 
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Table 4-9 CPAs' v. Non-CPAs' Client Advocacy (CA) Scores 
Certification N 
Mean CA 
Score Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Non-CPA 252 2.79 .814 .051 
 
CPA 286 2.79 .756 .045 
Difference (Sig. 2-tailed)  0.00 (0.92)   
This table compares the mean Client Advocacy (CA) score of CPAs and Non-CPAs from the full sample of tax preparers. A 
lower mean score means greater importance is placed on the construct. 
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Table 4-10 CPA Clients' v. Non-CPA Clients' Client Advocacy (CA) Scores 
Panel 1 – Actual Certification 
Certification N Mean CA Score Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Non-CPA Client 319 3.15 .920 .052 
CPA Client 148 3.06 .866 .071 
Difference (Sig. 2-tailed)  0.09 (0.31)   
Panel 2 – Perceived Certification 
Non-CPA Client 114 3.18 .909 .085 
CPA Client 308 3.11 .914 .052 
Difference (Sig. 2-tailed)  0.07 (0.47)   
 
This table compares the mean Client Advocacy (CA) score of the clients of CPAs and Non-CPAs.  In the first panel are the 
actual CPA and Non-CPA clients based on the response of the corresponding tax preparer.  In the second panel are the 
clients’ perceptions based on their answers about their tax preparer.  Note that 160 taxpayers believe they are using the 
services of a CPA when in fact they are not.  A lower mean score means greater importance is placed on that construct. 
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Table 4-11 National Tax Preparation Firms' Clients' v. Other Taxpayers' 
Accuracy (AR) Scores 
Panel 1 – Actual National Tax Preparation Firm Clients 
Participant N Mean AR Score Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
NTP Clients 23 2.04 1.031 .215 
Non-NTP Clients 487 2.47 1.308 .059 
Difference (Sig. 2-tailed)  -0.43 (.066)   
Panel 2 – Perceived National Tax Preparation Firm Clients 
NTP Clients 17 2.14 .993 .241 
Non-NTP Clients 460 2.49 1.320 .062 
Difference (Sig. 2-tailed)  -0.35 (.174)   
This table compares the mean Accurate Return (AR) score for the clients of National Tax Preparation (NTP) firms to other 
types of firms.  In the first panel are the actual NTP and Non-NTP clients based on the response of the corresponding tax 
preparer.  In the second panel are the clients’ perceptions based on their answers about their tax preparer’s firm.  Note that 
six taxpayers believe they not are using the services of a NTP when in fact they are.  A lower mean score means a greater 
importance is placed on that construct. 
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Table 4-12 Income’s, Dependent Children’s, and Tax Complexity's Effect 
on Saving Time (ST) Scores 
Panel 1 – Income’s Effect on ST 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 4.886 5 .977 .861 .507 
Within Groups 559.486 493 1.135   
Total 564.372 498    
Panel 2 – Children’s Effect on ST for All Taxpayers 
 
Number of Children N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
One or more children 230 2.39 1.031 .068 
 
No children 263 2.64 1.082 .067 
Difference (p-value)  -0.25 (.008)   
Panel 3 – Marital Status’ Effect on ST for Taxpayers with Dependent Children 
Marital Status N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Single (Single, Widow, Head of 
Household) 137 2.52 1.128 .096 
Married (Married Filing Joint) 344 2.54 1.043 .056 
Difference (p-value)  -0.02 (.858)   
Panel 4 – Return Complexity’s Effect on ST 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 25.110 18 1.395 1.200 .257 
Within Groups 538.425 463 1.163   
Total 563.535 481    
Panel 5 – Children, Income and Complexity’s Effect on ST 
 Beta Std. Error t-statistic Sig. 
Constant 2.646 0.188 14.070 0.000 
Child -0.94 0.039 -2.394 0.17 
Complexity 0.13 0.018 0.741 0.459 
Income -0.42 0.054 -0.778 0.437 
This table shows the effect of income, dependent children, marital status and return complexity on the mean Saving time 
(ST) scores.  The first panel shows that income has no effect on the desire to save time.  This was tested with a one-way 
ANOVA using the categorical income variable as the independent variable and the ST score as the dependent variable.  
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The second panel shows that dependent children significantly increase the desire to save time.  This was tested with a two-
sample t-test of the means and equal variances was not assumed.  A lower mean score indicates a greater importance 
placed on the construct.  The third panel is showing only those taxpayers with children and compares the mean scores of 
those claiming “Married Filing Joint” status with the other filing statuses. This was also tested with a two-sample t-test of the 
means using marital status as the independent variable and ST as the dependent variable. The final panel examines the 
effect of return complexity on ST.  This was tested with a one-way ANOVA using return complexity (as measured by the 
number of items of income or deductions checked by the taxpayer) as the independent variable and the ST score as the 
dependent variable. The fifth panel shows the results of a regression.  Child was a categorical variable ranging from 0 for no 
children, 1 for 1 child, etc., up to 5 for 5 or more children.  Complexity was the sum of the items of income or deduction 
checked by the taxpayer-participant.  A higher number would mean more complexity.  Income was a categorical variable 
ranging from the lowest income category of 1 to the highest of 5. 
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Table 4-13 IRS Contact's Effect on the Desire to Avoid the IRS (IRS) 
Scores 
Panel 1 – IRS Contact’s Effect on IRS 
 
Contact N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
No IRS Contact 328 4.36 1.443 .080 
 
IRS Contact 160 4.65 1.404 .111 
Difference (p-value)  -0.29 (.031)   
Panel 2 – Office Audit 
 
Contact N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
 
No Office Audit 450 4.42 1.433 .068 
Had to visit IRS Office 38 4.91 1.403 .228 
Difference  -0.49 (.042)   
This table shows the effect contact with the IRS has on the desire to avoid or be protected from the IRS (IRS).  The first 
panel shows the effect of any type of contact – letter, office audit, or field audit.  The second panel shows only the effect of 
the office audit.  There were not enough taxpayers with a field audit to examine that effect.  A lower mean score indicates 
greater importance is placed on the construct.  Both were tested using a two-sample t-test and without assuming equal 
variances. 
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Figure 4-1Tax Preparers' Instrument 
Informed Consent Sheet: 
 
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? 
You are being invited to take part in a research study that examines the relationship between tax professionals and their 
clients. Tax professionals are completing this survey. There is a similar one for taxpayers.  
 
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? 
The person in charge of this study is Teresa Stephenson, PhD Candidate at the Von Allmen School of Accountancy, Gatton 
College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky. Dr. Cynthia Vines, also of University of Kentucky, is guiding her 
in this research. There may be other people on the research team assisting at different times during the study. 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? 
By doing this study, we hope to learn more about how taxpayers choose their tax professionals, what they want from their 
tax professionals and how well tax professionals are addressing those wants and needs. 
 
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST? 
The research procedures will be conducted at the Von Allmen School of Accountancy, Gatton College of Business and 
Economics, University of Kentucky and/or College of Business, University of Wyoming. This survey is the only time I will 
need your assistance in this study. I anticipate that it will take you less than 30 minutes to answer the questions asked. 
 
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO? 
You will be given questions that relate to one of two topics.  Nine questions ask your opinions on client advocacy.  Fourteen 
questions ask what you think your clients are looking for in a tax preparation service . Each question is on a scale of 
'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree.' There will then be demographic information collected on your qualifications and 
practice and an opportunity to have your clients participate anonymously in a similar survey.  If you choose to ask your 
clients participate, then from their surveys, I will provide to you, at no cost, an analysis of how well your practice is 
addressing your clients' needs.  In exchange you agree to let me use those results in my dissertation and other research.   
 
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? 
None of which I am aware. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? 
To the best of our knowledge, the responses you will provide pose no risks to you, and by participating in this study you 
undertake no more risk than you would experience in everyday life. 
 
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
You are able to benefit from this study if you agree to forward a URL link via email or hard copy surveys similar to this one to 
your clients and ask them to participate. In return for this, I will analyze your clients' data and return a report to you 
summarizing the results and comparing them to your answers. In exchange, I retain the right to use the acquired information 
in my dissertation and other research publications. However, the information is only used in aggregate, and no identifying 
information is ever published (none is collected on your clients, except that they are your client). 
 
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer. You can stop at any time during the 
study. 
 
IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER CHOICES? 
Just discard this request. 
 
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE? 
There are no costs associated with taking part in this study. 
 
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT OR REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY? 
You will not receive any payment or reward for taking part in this study. However, if you choose to have your clients 
participate, you will receive a personalized report as described above. 
 
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION YOU GIVE? 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write up the study to 
share it with other researchers, we will write about this combined information. You will not be identified in these written 
materials. 
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CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? 
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want to continue. 
 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might come to 
mind now. You can contact the investigator, Teresa Stephenson at 859-257-2819 or at tstep2@uky.edu. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a research volunteer, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of 
Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428. You will be given more information about this study after 
completing the survey. 
 
By returning the completed survey in the self-addressed stamped envelope, you agree that you have read, 
understood and agree to the terms of this informed consent letter. 
 
Part 1 of 4 (Client Advocacy) 
Please answer the following questions. It is best to work quickly and use your first instinct when choosing an 
answer.51
 
When examining a tax return, I tend to point out to taxpayers reasonable positions they could 
have taken which would have contributed to minimizing their tax liability. 
The taxpayer has the right to structure transactions in ways that yield the best tax result, 
even if the law is unclear in an area. 
It is important to use trends in the law by trying to establish a pattern of more favorable 
treatment for the taxpayer and then extending this pattern to the taxpayer’s position. 
I always interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of the taxpayers. 
Where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue, I feel that the taxpayer is entitled 
to take the most favorable tax treatment. 
I feel I should apply ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer’s benefit. 
Generally speaking, my loyalties are first to the tax system, then to the taxpayer. 
I believe it is important that I encourage taxpayers to pay the least amount of taxes possible. 
In an instance where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue and where the Code 
and Regulations are ambiguous, I feel that the taxpayer is entitled to take the most favorable 
tax treatment. 
 
Part 2 of 4 (Client Motivation) 
In this section, please answer the questions in the way that you feel your clients would answer them. 
 
Even though I pay a fee, I come out ahead financially with a tax professional. 
I have my taxes professionally prepared and although it costs me money, it saves me 
valuable time. 
I have my taxes professionally prepared because I don't have time to do it myself. 
I would rather pay a little more in taxes and make sure I haven't broken any laws. 
I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on my taxes. 
I have my taxes professionally prepared so that if the IRS questions it, I won't be the one who 
gets in trouble. 
If I paid enough to have my taxes prepared, I could end up without any tax liability. 
The IRS won't prosecute me personally if my tax professional is wrong about something. 
I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on tax preparation charges. 
I have my taxes professionally prepared because it saves me money overall. 
                                                 
51 All questions in Part 1 and Part 2 were asked on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly 
Disagree. 
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It takes so long to do tax returns; I would rather let a professional handle it. 
My tax professional saves me money. 
It's okay to pay a little more to have a professional prepare my taxes as long as it doesn't 
take my time. 
I have my taxes professionally prepared so that I know I'll never have to face the IRS. 
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Part 3 of 4 (Demographics) 
Please answer the following demographic questions about yourself and your firm. 
 
The following best describes me (check all that apply):
 CPA 
 Enrolled Agent 
 Some formal accounting/tax school – no degree 
 Four year degree in accounting 
 Graduate School 
 Terminal Degree (PhD, JD, etc.) 
 Tax Attorney 
 Other certification(s) please list below: 
 
I have been preparing taxes for: 
 0-5 years 
 6-10 years 
 11-20 years 
 21+ years 
My current firm is: 
 A law practice 
 A “Big 4” CPA firm 
 A Regional CPA firm 
 A local CPA firm with more than 10 CPAs
 A local CPA firm with 10 or fewer CPAs 
 A national tax preparation service 
 A local tax preparation service 
 Other (please specify below): 
 
 
 
The percentage of my time spent in tax matters is:
 1-20% 
 21-40% 
 41-60% 
 61-80% 
 81-100% 
 
I personally prepare and/or sign: 
 1-25 returns a year 
 26-100 returns a year 
 101-500 returns a year 
 500+ returns a year 
 
Part 4 of 4 (Client Survey) 
 
You have the opportunity to send a similar survey to your clients and receive an analysis of 
their responses. This would be at no cost to you, and without divulging your client list to me. 
In exchange, I will analyze your clients’ results and provide you a summary of the results and 
how well you are meeting your clients’ needs. You agree to allow me to use the findings in 
my dissertation and future research. In no circumstance will any information be published in 
such a way that an individual could be identified. It will all be reported in aggregate (i.e. 40% 
of female taxpayers said…). If you are interesting in this or in receiving more information on 
it, please put your contact information here or include your business card when returning this 
survey. If you are not interested, please return the survey anyway, just leave this section 
blank. 
 
Name: 
Phone number: 
Email address: 
Approximate number of clients: 
 
Thank you so much for your time. Please return the survey pages in the enclosed self-
addressed stamped envelope. Keep the informed consent for your records. Add below any 
comments about the survey that you may have: 
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Figure 4-2 Taxpayers' Instrument 
Informed Consent Sheet: 
 
WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? 
You are being invited to take part in a research study that examines the relationship between tax professionals and their 
clients. Taxpayers are completing this survey. There is a similar one for tax professionals. 
 
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? 
The person in charge of this study is Teresa Stephenson, PhD Candidate at the Von Allmen School of Accountancy, Gatton 
College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky. Dr. Cynthia Vines, also of University of Kentucky, is guiding her 
in this research. There may be other people on the research team assisting at different times during the study. 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? 
By doing this study, we hope to learn more about how taxpayers choose their tax professionals, what they want from their 
tax professionals and how well tax professionals are addressing those wants and needs. 
 
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST? 
The research procedures will be conducted at the Von Allmen School of Accountancy, Gatton College of Business and 
Economics, University of Kentucky and/or College of Business, University of Wyoming. This survey is the only time I will 
need your assistance in this study. I anticipate that it will take you less than 30 minutes to answer the questions asked. 
 
WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO? 
You will be given questions that relate to one of two topics.  Fourteen questions ask what you are looking for in a tax 
preparation service. Nine questions ask how you think your tax preparer would answer questions regarding client advocacy.  
Each question is on a scale of 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree.' There will then be demographic information collected 
on you and your tax professional’s qualifications and practice. 
 
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY? 
None of which I am aware.  
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS? 
To the best of our knowledge, the responses you will provide pose no risks to you, and by participating in this study, you 
undertake no more risk than you would experience in everyday life. 
 
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
You will not directly benefit from this survey. However, my research may be able to help your tax professional more closely 
meet your future needs. Additionally, you will be given the opportunity at the end of the survey to vote for a charity to which I 
will donate as a way of saying “Thank you” to you.  
 
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer. You can stop at any time during the 
study. 
 
IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER CHOICES? 
Just discard this request. 
 
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE? 
There are no costs associated with taking part in this study. 
 
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT OR REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY? 
You will not receive any payment or reward for taking part in this study. However, I will donate $100 to the charity that 
receives the most votes and $50 each to the charities that receive the second and third most votes as a way of saying 
“Thank you” to you. 
 
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION YOU GIVE? 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we write up the study to 
share it with other researchers, we will write about this combined information. If your tax professional asked you to 
participate in this survey, a report with the consolidated answers from all his or her clients will be provided to him or her. 
Nothing you say will be reported separately. You will not be identified in these written materials. 
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CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY? 
If you decide to take part in the study, you still have the right to decide at any time that you no longer want to continue.  
 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any questions that might come to 
mind now. You can contact the investigator, Teresa Stephenson at 859-257-2819 or at tstep2@uky.edu. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a research volunteer, contact the staff in the Office of Research Integrity at the University of 
Kentucky at 859-257-9428 or toll free at 1-866-400-9428. You will be given more information about this study after 
completing the survey. 
 
By returning the completed survey in the self-addressed stamped envelope, you agree that you have read, 
understood and agree to the terms of this informed consent letter. 
 
Part 1 of 4 (Client Motivation) 
Please answer the following questions. It is best to work quickly and use your first instinct when choosing an 
answer. 52
 
Even though I pay a fee, I come out ahead financially with a tax professional.  
I have my taxes professionally prepared and although it costs me money, it saves me valuable time.  
I have my taxes professionally prepared because I don't have time to do it myself.  
I would rather pay a little more in taxes and make sure I haven't broken any laws.  
I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on my taxes.  
I have my taxes professionally prepared so that if the IRS questions it, I won't be the one who gets in trouble.  
If I paid enough to have my taxes prepared, I could end up without any tax liability.  
The IRS won't prosecute me personally if my tax professional is wrong about something.  
I would rather be protected from penalties than save money on tax preparation charges.  
I have my taxes professionally prepared because it saves me money overall.  
It takes so long to do tax returns; I would rather let a professional handle it.  
My tax professional saves me money.  
It's okay to pay a little more to have a professional prepare my taxes as long as it doesn't take my time.  
I have my taxes professionally prepared so that I know I'll never have to face the IRS.  
 
Part 2 of 4 (Client Advocacy) 
In this section, please answer the questions in the way that you feel your tax professional would answer them. 
 
When examining a tax return, I tend to point out to taxpayers reasonable positions they could have taken which 
would have contributed to minimizing their tax liability.  
The taxpayer has the right to structure transactions in ways that yield the best tax result, even if the law is 
unclear in an area.  
It is important to use trends in the law by trying to establish a pattern of more favorable treatment for the 
taxpayer and then extending this pattern to the taxpayer’s position.  
I always interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of the taxpayers.  
Where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue, I feel that the taxpayer is entitled to take the most 
favorable tax treatment.  
I feel I should apply ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer’s benefit.  
Generally speaking, my loyalties are first to the tax system, then to the taxpayer.  
I believe it is important that I encourage taxpayers to pay the least amount of taxes possible.  
In an instance where no judicial authority exists with respect to an issue and where the Code and Regulations 
are ambiguous, I feel that the taxpayer is entitled to take the most favorable tax treatment.  
 
                                                 
52 All questions in Part 1 and Part 2 were asked on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly 
Disagree. 
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Part 3 of 4 (Taxpayer Information) 
Please answer the following demographic questions about yourself. Remember, this is an 
anonymous survey and your answers will only be combined with those of other 
participants when used in research. 
 
Here are some common income items. Please select any items for which anyone included on your tax return 
has had in the past five years whether or not it was included as income on your return. 
 Salary as an employee from main job 
 Salary as an employee from extra job 
 Income from your own business, partnership, or S corporation
 Social security income 
 Other pension/retirement income 
 Dividends 
 Interest on savings or bank accounts 
 Cash payments from side jobs 
 Tips 
 Profit from sale of goods or services 
 Barter for goods or services 
 Unemployment compensation 
 Rental or real estate income 
 Commissions or bonuses 
 Gambling, hobby, prize or award income 
 Investment Income 
 Other (please specify): 
 
 
 
The following is a list of common deductions and tax credit items. Please place a check next to any time you 
have had in the past five years: 
 Medical expenses 
I consider myself to be:  Charitable contributions 
 An expert in tax matters  Mortgage interest 
 More knowledgeable than most in tax matters  Business expenses 
 Average in tax matters  Child-care expenses 
 Relatively uninformed about tax matters  Political contributions 
 Completely clueless about tax matters  Earned income credit 
 Exemption for dependent(s) 
 Other (please specify): 
 
 
 
Part 3 of 4 (Taxpayer Information Continued) 
Again, remember nothing that will identify you is collected and your information will only be reported 
combined with other taxpayers’ results. 
 What is your filing status? 
What is your household income?  Single 
 Less than $25,000  Married filing joint 
 $25,000 to less than $50,000  Married filing separate 
 $50,000 to less than $100,000  Head of household 
 $100,000 or more  Qualifying widow(er) 
 Prefer not to answer  Prefer not to answer 
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What is your ethnicity? 
 Black/African American 
How many dependent children do you have in your 
household? 
 White/Caucasian 
 Native American 
 0  Latino/Hispanic 
 1  Asian/Pacific Islander 
 2  Other 
 Prefer not to answer  3 
  4 
What is your age?  5 or more 
 Under 18  Prefer not to answer   18-24 
 25-34 
 34-44 
 45-54 
 55-64 
 65+ 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
What is the highest educational 
level you’ve attained? 
 Less than high school 
 High school  
 Some college 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Doctorate 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
Have you ever been audited or contacted by the IRS?
 No 
 Yes, the IRS sent me a letter 
 Yes, I had to visit an IRS office 
 Yes, the IRS came to visit me 
 Prefer not to answer 
 
 
What is your gender?  
 Male  
 Female  
 
Part 4 of 4 (Taxpayer Professional Information) 
 Prefer not to answer 
This section is for information about your tax professional. Since he or she has asked you to 
do this survey, I already have some of this information, but please answer the questions with 
what you believe about your tax professional. 
 
My tax professional’s name is <name of professional>:
 True 
 False (please include name): 
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The following best describes my tax professional (check all that apply):
 CPA 
 Enrolled Agent 
 Some formal accounting/tax school – no degree 
 Four year degree in accounting 
 Graduate School 
 Terminal Degree (PhD, JD, etc.) 
 Tax Attorney 
 Other certification(s) please list below: 
 
 
 
 My tax professional works for (best guess): 
 
 A law practice  
 A “Big 4” CPA firm  
 A Regional CPA firm  
 A local CPA firm with more than 10 CPAs  
 
 
 A local CPA firm with 10 or fewer CPAs 
 A national tax preparation service 
  A local tax preparation service  
  Other (please specify below): 
  
 
 
If you have completely filled out this survey, I would like to give you the opportunity to vote for a charity 
that will receive a donation as a way of saying “Thank you” for taking the time to help me. The one with 
the most votes will receive $100 and the second and third runners-up will receive $50 each. 
 
Please send a donation to 
 Doctors without Borders 
 Big Brothers/Big Sisters 
 Reading is Fundamental 
 Humane Society of the United States 
 
 
 
 
  Nature Conservancy 
  Cancer Research Institute 
 American Red Cross  
 I prefer to name my own:   
  
 
 
Thank you so much for your time. Please return the survey pages in the enclosed self-
addressed stamped envelope. Keep the informed consent for your records. Add below any 
comments about the survey that you may have: 
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